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Abstract
We study firms’ compatibility choices in the presence of consumers’ switching
costs. We analyze both a model of once-and-for-all compatibility choices and a
model with dynamic choices. Contrary to what happens in a static setting in which
symmetric firms embrace compatibility to soften the current competition (Matutes
and Régibeau, 1988), when consumer lock-in arises due to a significant switching
cost, firms make their products incompatible in order to soften future competition
in both models we consider. This reduces consumer surplus and social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Will the future of the Internet be dominated by incompatible platforms? Back in the 90s’
when the Internet was at its dawn, openness and compatibility seemed to be the future.
For instance, during the times, Microsoft was the dominant player in the personal com-
puter market but decided to bring two of its most successful software, Internet Explorer
and Microsoft Office, to Macs. However, after the turn of the 21st century, we seem to
enter a new era in which platforms try to lock-in customers by making it hard to move
data across platforms or by providing some benefits exclusively to those who use all from
the same ecosystem. According to Larry Page, a co-founder of Google and the CEO of
its parent company, Alphabet Inc.,:
"The Internet was made in universities and it was designed to interoperate.
And as we’ve commercialized it, we’ve added more of an island-like approach
to it, which I think is a somewhat a shame for users."1
If a consumer purchased applications from iTunes (Google Play), she is more likely to
choose an iPhone (an Android phone) instead of an Android phone (an iPhone). The same
logic applies to services like: iMessage and iCloud versus Hangouts and Google account,
One Drive versus Google Drive, iCloud Keychain versus Chrome password syncing. In
fact, the smartphone loyalty in US is very high as 91 percent stayed with Android and
86 percent stayed with iOS when customers upgraded their phone in 2017.2 In cloud
computing, from the beginning, a major concern was vendor lock-in where due to incom-
patible technologies, customers would incur a huge cost if they wish to transfer their data
from one vendor to another3. This kind of phenomenon is known as "walled garden". As
cloud computing technology becomes ubiquitous, the risk of lock-in in walled gardens of
data generalizes.
Furthermore, Apple and Google are expanding their businesses outside of the phone
industry by leveraging their established smartphone platforms: smart car, smart TV,
Google glasses, Apple watch, Apple pay etc. These new hardware and software bring the
ultimate lock-in experience. For instance, Android Wear only works with Android phones
1http://fortune.com/2012/12/11/fortune-exclusive-larry-page-on-google/
2https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/08/android-beats-ios-in-smartphone-loyalty-study-
finds/?guccounter=1
3http://fortune.com/2015/10/08/aws-lock-in-worry/
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and tablets. Apple Watch supports iPhones and iPads exclusively. We enter an era where
working across multiple ecosystems deprive consumers of real benefit. This is why Drew
Houston, CEO of Dropbox, says that consumers are "trapped" in each platform.4
In this paper, we attempt to offer a novel insight to understand platforms’ compat-
ibility choices from a dynamic perspective, which is relevant because devices must be
upgraded and subscriptions to services must be renewed. As the main result, we show
that when consumer lock-in arises due to a significant switching cost, symmetric firms
make their products incompatible in order to soften future competition, which hurts
consumers and reduces welfare. More generally, we find a strong conflict between the
compatibility regime chosen by the firms and the one maximizing consumer surplus. Our
result is opposite to what happens in a static model in which symmetric firms make their
products compatible to soften competition (Matutes and Régibeau, 1988).
We extend the mix-and-match compatibility model of Matutes and Régibeau (1988)
to two periods. They study compatibility choices made by two symmetric firms (A and
B) who compete to sell a system of complementary products (x and y). Therefore, un-
der compatibility, four systems are available ((A,A), (A,B), (B,A), (B,B)) while under
incompatibility, only two pure systems, (A,A) and (B,B), are available. They study a
two-stage game in which the first stage of non-cooperative choice between compatibility
and incompatibility is followed by the second stage of price competition. We consider two
different dynamic extensions of their setup. In our Model 1 of once-and-for-all compatibil-
ity choices, the firms make their choices only in period one and the compatibility regime
determined in period one is maintained in period two. In Model 2 of dynamic compat-
ibility choices, the firms make their choices every period. Both models are identical to
that of Matutes and Régibeau if there were no second period. In the second period of
our models, each platform competes to poach consumers by offering prices dependent on
their past purchase behavior (Chen, 1997 and Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000): there is price
discrimination depending on which product or system of products a consumer bought in
the first period.5
Consider first Model 1 of once-and-for-all compatibility choices. When products are
compatible, there are four submarkets in period two: the market ij refers to the market
4http://vimeo.com/70089044
5For instance, apple launched Android device trade-in program to encourage iPhone upgrade:
http://9to5mac.com/2015/03/16/applewillofferandroidswitchersgiftcardstotradeinrivalsmartphonesforiphones/
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composed of the consumers who bought product j = x, y from firm i = A,B in period
one. We assume that each consumer discovers the value that she obtains from a product,
which is a random draw from a uniform distribution, only after consuming it. We assume
for simplicity that all consumers incur the same switching cost per product s > 0. For
instance, if a consumer wants to switch from x of A to x of B, she should incur s and
therefore firm A is dominant and firm B is dominated in market Ax. When products
are incompatible, there are two submarkets (A,A) and (B,B) in period two, where the
market (A,A) is composed of the consumers who bought the system (A,A) in period one.
If a consumer wants to switch from (A,A) to (B,B), she should incur a switching cost of
2s.
When we study how incompatibility affects the firms’ second-period profits from the
consumers who bought say (A,A) in period one, we find three thresholds of switching
costs (s1, s2, s3) with s1 < s2 < s3 such that the dominant firm’s profit is higher under
incompatibility than under compatibility for s > s1, the industry profit is higher under
incompatibility for s > s2 and the dominated firm’s profit is higher under incompatibil-
ity for s > s3. In other words, when the switching cost is high enough, incompatibility
softens second-period competition relative to compatibility. This result can be under-
stood from Hahn and Kim (2012) and Hurkens, Jeon and Menicucci (2018), who extend
Matutes and Régibeau (1988) to asymmetric platforms (one is dominant and the other
is dominated).6 They consider a static model and find that when the level of dominance
is large enough, both the dominant firm and the dominated firm prefer incompatibility
since incompatibility softens competition. This mechanism is in place in our model as
the level of dominance increases with s. In Section 3.3, following Hurkens, Jeon and
Menicucci (2018), we decompose the effect of incompatibility into a demand size effect
and a demand elasticity effect and explain how incompatibility softens the second-period
competition when switching cost is high.
When we study the first-period competition for a given regime of compatibility, each
firm charges a price smaller than the one in Matutes and Régibeau (1988) by the difference
equal to the rent from a locked-in consumer. Hence, they dissipate this rent by competing
6Hahn and Kim (2012) introduce asymmetric costs in a Hotelling model with a uniform distribution
of consumers, which was studied by Matutes and Régibeau (1988). Hurkens, Jeon and Menicucci (2018)
introduce asymmetric product values, consider the family of log-concave distributions which include the
uniform distribution and provide a unified intuition based on the decomposition of the effect of bundling
into a demand size effect and a demand elasticity effect.
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more aggressively in period one. This implies that each firm’s total profit is the sum of
the static profit in Matutes and Régibeau (1988) and the profit that a firm realizes in
period two if it attracted no consumer in period one. The latter is equal to what we
call the profit of the dominated firm. Therefore, for s > s3, if the relative weight of the
second-period payoff is large enough, the firms choose incompatibility in period one in
order to soften future competition.
As the firms make compatibility choices mainly to soften competition, we find a strong
conflict between the compatibility regime chosen by the firms and the one maximizing
consumer surplus, regardless of the model we consider. In particular, in Model 1 of once-
and-for-all compatibility choices, whenever the firms choose incompatibility, it generates a
lower consumer surplus than under compatibility. We also find a similar conflict between
firm’s choices and welfare. In particular, whenever firms choose incompatibility, it gener-
ates a smaller welfare than compatibility, regardless of the model we consider. Welfare is
lower under incompatibility as consumers lose the ability to mix and match the products.
The analysis of Model 2 of dynamic compatibility choices generates two interesting
insights. First, Model 2 shows that the prediction of Model 1 is robust in two different
ways. When we consider the equilibrium compatibility choice, both models generate
similar predictions. Furthermore, even when we study equilibrium for a given regime
of the first-period compatibility, we find that the firms end up choosing, in period two,
compatibility (incompatibility) for low switching cost (i.e. s < s1) (for high switching
cost and high discount factor).
Second, the interaction between compatibility choices and poaching generates an inter-
esting asymmetry in the dynamics of compatibility choices. When we study the second-
period compatibility choice for a given first-period market outcome, we find that for low
switching cost, there is no path dependency as the firms always choose compatibility. In
contrast, for high switching cost, path dependency can arise. This is because compatibil-
ity in period one generates consumers who buy the hybrid systems (A,B) and (B,A) and
competition for these consumers in period two is more intense under incompatibility than
under compatibility. For this reason, the first-period compatibility leads to the second-
period compatibility as long as the share of the hybrid systems is large enough. On the
other hand, the first-period incompatibility always leads to the second-period incompati-
bility for high switching cost (for the reasons explained when we presented the main result
in Model 1). Such path dependency arises in our model even if we make the first-period
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market shares endogenous in our model for high switching cost and low discount factor.7
We merge two different strands of literature, the one on compatibility and the one on
poaching. First, as incompatibility is equivalent to pure bundling, our paper is related
to literature on bundling and/or incompatibility, mainly the one on competitive bundling
where entry and exit is not an issue (Matutes and Régibeau 1988, 1992, Economides,
1989, Carbajo, De Meza and Seidmann, 1990, Chen 1997, Denicolo 2000, Nalebuff, 2000,
Armstrong and Vickers, 2010, Carlton, Gans, and Waldman, 2010, Thanassoulis 2011).8
In particular, there has been a recent development of the line of research initiated by
Matutes and Régibeau (1988). While Matutes and Régibeau (1988) find that incom-
patibility intensifies competition in a symmetric duopoly, the extension to asymmetric
duopoly by Hahn and Kim (2012) and Hurkens, Jeon and Menicucci (2018) shows that
for large asymmetry, incompatibility softens competition. Kim and Choi (2015) and Zhou
(2017) consider symmetric oligopoly of more than two firms and find that incompatibility
can soften competition when the number of firms is above a threshold which can be small.
We contribute to this literature by considering a dynamic setup and showing that even a
symmetric duopoly can prefer incompatibility to soften competition.
Second, our two-period game is similar to the games considered in the literature on
poaching (Chen, 1997, Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). The main difference is that we
consider multi-product firms and their compatibility choices. The interaction between
compatibility choices and poaching generates an interesting dynamics in the way today’s
compatibility choice influences tomorrow’s one.
Chen, Doraszelski and Harrington (2009) is close to Model 2 of our paper in the sense
that they consider a duopoly price competition in a dynamic model (of infinite horizon) in
which each firm chooses between compatibility and incompatibility every period. However,
they consider compatibility choices in the presence of network effects as in Katz and
7For high switching cost and high discount factor, the first-period compatibility leads to a cornering
equilibrium such that the cornering firm chooses incompatibility in period two. However, we conjecture
that the path dependency would emerge even for high discount factor in a different model in which a
non-negligible share of consumers has strong preferences for the hybrid systems.
8There are two other branches of the bundling literature. The first one includes the papers that view
bundling as a price discrimination device for a monopolist (Stigler, 1968, Schmalensee, 1984, McAfee et
al. 1989, Salinger 1995, Armstrong 1996, Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999, Fang and Norman, 2006, Chen
and Riordan, 2013, Menicucci, Hurkens, and Jeon, 2015). The second is the leverage theory of bundling
in which the main motive of bundling is to deter entry or induce the exit of rival firms in the competitive
segment of the market (Whinston, 1990, Choi, 1996, Choi and Stefanadis 2001, Carlton and Waldman,
2002, Nalebuff, 2004, Peitz 2008, Jeon and Menicucci, 2006, 2012).
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Shapiro (1985) and Crémer, Rey and Tirole (2000) and do not consider poaching. Then,
symmetric firms always adopt compatibility as they only benefit from a larger network
effect.9 In contrast, we build on the literature of mix-and-match compatibility initiated
by Matutes and Régibeau (1988) which does not consider network effects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the
second-period price competition given a compatibility regime and introduces the demand
size effect and the demand elasticity effect of incompatibility. Section 4 analyzes Model 1.
Section 5 analyzes Model 2. Section 6 presents the analysis of forward-looking consumers
and Section 7 provides the analysis of consumer surplus and welfare. Section 8 presents
an extension studying the relationship between compatibility choices and market growth.
Section 9 provides the conclusion. All the proofs are gathered in Appendix; the long proof
of Proposition 6 is in the on-line Appendix.
2 The setup
There are two firms, i = A,B, who produce two products, j = x, y. In our model, the two
products can be perfect complements or can be independently consumed, but our results
are the same as long as each consumer obtains a high enough utility from each product,
which we assume. Since each firm produces both products, four systems of products are
possible: (x, y) = (A,A), (A,B), (B,A), (B,B). We consider two-period models in which
consumers have switching costs in the second period.
Each firm’s marginal cost of producing a product is c, which is large enough such that
if a consumer bought product j = x, y from a firm, then she has no incentive to buy the
same product from the competing firm. Thus, at each period t = 1, 2, every consumer
has a unit demand for each product. Given this assumption, we normalize c to zero and
interpret each price as the mark up above the marginal cost without loss of generality.
Regarding compatibility choices, we consider two different models. In Model 1, firms
make compatibility choices once-and-for-all. Precisely, we assume that in the beginning
of period one each firm simultaneously and non-cooperatively chooses between compati-
9They consider initially symmetric firms but assume some randomness in each firm’s demand. They
ask whether incompatibility will prevail when some firm happens to have a higher installed base than
the other firm. They find some countervailing incentive of very aggressive pricing by the firm with lower
installed base such that this tends to prevent the difference in installed bases from reaching the point
that incompatibility arises.
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bility and incompatibility. Compatibility prevails only if both firms choose compatibility;
otherwise, incompatibility prevails. In Model 1, the regime determined in period one is
maintained in period two. In Model 2, we consider dynamic compatibility choices such
that each firm makes a compatibility choice at the beginning of every period.
In the first period, consumers have heterogeneous costs of learning to use each product
as in Klemperer (1995). Precisely, each consumer is characterized by a pair of locations
(θx, θy) ∈ [0, 1]2 which determine her learning cost for each product: tθj (t(1 − θj)) is
the learning cost for product Aj (Bj) for j = x, y, for some t > 0. Hence, a consumer
located at (θx, θy) ∈ [0, 1]2 incurs a total learning cost of tθx + tθy to use system (A,A);
the learning cost is tθx + t(1− θy) for system (A,B). The locations (θx, θy) are uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]2 in the population of consumers.
In the beginning of period one, every consumer has the same expected valuation,
ve, for each product. Therefore, depending on the compatibility regime, the first-period
utility of a consumer located at (θx, θy) from purchasing (A,A) is given as follows. Under
compatibility, it is
U1(A,A) = 2v
e − pA1,x − pA1,y − tθx − tθy; (1)
under incompatibility, it is
U1(A,A) = 2v
e − PA1 − tθx − tθy,
where pi1,j is the price for product j of firm i in period one under compatibility and P i1 is
the price of the system (i, i) in period one under incompatibility.10 If there is no second
period, our models are identical to that of Matutes and Régibeau (1988).
Once a consumer uses firm i’s product j in period one, she discovers her own true
value vij for the product, which is ex ante a random draw from a uniform distribution over
[v, v], with v > 0. Hence, ve = (v + v) /2. We assume that the distribution is independent
across different products and different consumers.
Now let us describe what happens in the second period. Consider for instance a
consumer who bought product x from A in period one. Then she has learnt her value vAx .
Her choice in period two is either to consume the same product and obtain vAx , or to switch
to product x of B. In the latter case, her expected value is ve and in addition she has to
10For prices, we use lower-case letters under compatibility and upper-case letters under incompatibility.
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incur a switching cost of s > 0. The switching cost includes not only learning cost but also
other costs due to a consumer’s product-specific investment. For simplicity, we assume
that the switching cost is the same for all consumers and products. In addition, we assume
that each firm can engage in behaviour-based price discrimination to poach consumers:
the price a firm charges to a consumer in period two can depend on the history of the
consumer’s purchase in period one. Suppose now that a consumer who bought (A,A) in
the first period switches to (A,B) in the second period (which is possible only under the
second-period compatibility). Then, her second-period utility is given by:
U2(A,B)|(A,A) = vAx + v
e − pA2,x(A,A)− pB2,y(A,A)− s, (2)
where pi2,j(i, h) is the second-period price charged by firm i for product j under compati-
bility to the consumers who bought (i, h) in the first period with i, h ∈ {A,B}. Similarly,
if a consumer who bought (A,A) in the first period switches to (B,B) in the second period
under incompatibility, then her second-period utility is given by:
U2(B,B)|(A,A) = 2ve − PB2 (A,A)− 2s,
where P i2(i, h) is the second-period price charged by firm i for its system under incompat-
ibility to the consumers who bought (i, h) in the first period with i, h ∈ {A,B}.
All players have a common discount factor δ > 0: δ can be larger than one since
it represents the weight assigned to the second-period payoff. All firms have rational
expectations. We consider myopic consumers for our exposition, but consider forward-
looking consumers in Section 6 and show that with forward-looking consumers, our results
are unaffected in Model 1 and remain qualitatively similar in Model 2.
We introduce the following assumption to guarantee that a positive measure of con-
sumers switch in each sub-market in period two:
Assumption 1: s < 3
2
∆v where ∆v ≡ v − v.
If this assumption is not satisfied, then no switching occurs under compatibility in
period two.
In Model 2 of dynamic compatibility choices, the timing in each period is given by:
• Stage 1: Each firm simultaneously and non-cooperatively chooses between compat-
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ibility and incompatibility.
• Stage 2: After observing the compatibility choices, each firm simultaneously and
non-cooperatively chooses its price(s).
• Stage 3: Consumers make purchase decisions.
In Model 1 of once-and-for-all compatibility choices, Stage 1 occurs only in period one.
Notice that there always exist an equilibrium in which both firms choose incompatibility.
But we assume that each firm plays its weakly dominant action and therefore compatibility
arises if and only if both firms prefer compatibility.
In order to solve this two-period model, we first solve for the firms’ second-period
equilibrium behavior for any given first-period compatibility choice and market shares.
We find that equilibrium prices and profits are linearly homogenous in ∆v regardless of
the compatibility regime. Therefore sometimes it is useful to normalize ∆v to 1, as the
model with (∆v, s) is qualitatively equivalent to that with (1, s/∆v).
3 Second-period price competition given a compatibil-
ity regime
In this section, we first study the second-period price competition to poach consumers
for a given compatibility regime. Second, we show how incompatibility affects the second-
period profits relative to compatibility, which is very important to understand our main
result, Proposition 3.
3.1 Given compatibility
Suppose that compatibility prevails in the second period, and consider the market for
product j composed of the consumers who bought this product from firm i in the first
period. We call it market ij. As all four markets Ax, Ay, Bx, By are alike, it is enough to
analyze just one of them.11 We normalize the total mass of consumers in market ij to
11Without loss of generality, we can consider that the poaching price for product x (say) depends only
on whether a given consumer bought x from A or B but not on whether he bought y from A or B.
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one. In this market, the firms offer prices pi2,j(ij) and ph2,j(ij) with i 6= h and i, h = A,B.
To simplify notation, let us define:
p+2 ≡ pi2,j(ij), p−2 ≡ ph2,j(ij), d+2 ≡ di2,j (ij) , d−2 ≡ dh2,j (ij) , pi+2 = pii2,j(ij), pi−2 = pih2,j(ij),
where + (respectively, −) refers to the advantage of firm i (respectively, the disadvantage
of firm h) due to the switching cost and di2,j (ij) is the demand for product j of firm i and
pii2,j(ij) is firm i’s profit in market ij. A consumer with valuation vij for product j of firm
i is indifferent between staying with firm i and switching to firm h (6= i) if and only if
vij − p+2 = ve − p−2 − s.
The equilibrium prices, p+∗2 and p
−∗
2 , maximize p
+
2 d
+
2 and p
−
2 d
−
2 , respectively. We have:
Lemma 1. Suppose that compatibility prevails in period two and consider competition in
market ij composed of the consumers who bought product j from firm i in period one.
We normalize the total mass of consumers in market ij to one. There exists a unique
equilibrium, which is characterized as follows:
(i) The equilibrium prices are p+∗2 =
∆v
2
+ s
3
and p−∗2 =
∆v
2
− s
3
.
(ii) The firms’ profits from this market are pi+∗2 =
1
∆v
(
∆v
2
+ s
3
)2 and pi−∗2 = 1∆v (∆v2 − s3)2 .
Corollary 1. pi+∗2 + pi
−∗
2 strictly increases with s for s ∈
(
0, 3∆v
2
)
The corollary says that the industry profit in market ij under compatibility strictly
increases with s.
3.2 Given incompatibility
Suppose that incompatibility prevails in period two and consider the period two market
(i, i) composed of the consumers who purchased both products from firm i in the first
period. In this market, firms offer prices P i2(i, i) and P h2 (i, i) with i 6= h and i, h = A,B.
To simplify notation, let us define:
P+2 ≡ P i2(i, i), P−2 ≡ P h2 (i, i), D+2 ≡ Di2(i, i), D−2 ≡ Dh2 (i, i),Π+2 = Πi2(i, i),Π−2 = Πh2(i, i).
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A consumer with valuations
(
vix, v
i
y
)
is indifferent between buying (i, i) and (h, h) if and
only if
vix + v
i
y − P+2 = 2ve − P−2 − 2s.
We have:
Lemma 2. Suppose that incompatibility prevails in period two and consider the second-
period competition in the market composed of the consumers who bought a pure system in
period one. We normalize the total mass of consumers in this market to one. There exists
a unique equilibrium, which is characterized as follows:
(i) The equilibrium prices are P+∗2 =
1
8
[
3
√
(2s−∆v)2 + 8∆v2 + 5(2s−∆v)
]
and P−∗2 =
1
8
[√
(2s−∆v)2 + 8∆v2 − (2s−∆v)
]
.
(ii) The firms’ from this market are Π+∗2 =
(
1− 2(P
−∗
2 )
2
∆v2
)
P+∗2 and Π
−∗
2 =
2(P−∗2 )
3
∆v2
.
Corollary 2. Π+∗2 + Π
−∗
2 strictly increases with s for s ∈
(
0, 3∆v
2
)
.
The corollary says that the industry profit in market (i, i) under incompatibility strictly
increases with s.
3.3 The effects of incompatibility: the demand size effect and the
demand elasticity effect
In order to analyze how incompatibility affects the second-period profits relative to com-
patibility, we here apply the findings of Hurkens, Jeon and Menicucci (2018) to our model.
They study pure bundling (which is equivalent to incompatibility) in a static model where
two multi-product firms compete: one firm is dominant and the other is dominated in
both markets. They decompose the effects of incompatibility into a demand size effect
and a demand elasticity effect. We here apply their analysis to the second period of our
model by considering the market composed of the consumers who bought both products
from firm A (for instance) in period one. Then, firm A is the dominant firm and firm B is
the dominated firm given s > 0. We normalize the mass of the consumers of this market
to one.
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Demand size effect. Suppose that under compatibility firm A charges p+2 and firm B
charges p−2 to each product. Let v˜Aj be the valuation of the consumer who is indifferent
between switching and no switching; hence the demand for A’s product is 1 − F (v˜Aj ),
where F (·) is the distribution function of vAj over [v, v], which has a symmetric log-concave
density f(·) (including the uniform distribution). In any equilibrium with s > 0, we expect
v˜Aj < v
e and hence 1− F (v˜Aj ) > 1/2. Suppose now that there is incompatibility and that
each firm sells its system at a price equal to the sum of the prices under compatibility, that
is P+2 = 2p
+
2 and P
−
2 = 2p
−
2 . Then the indifferent consumer has the average valuation
equal to v˜Aj . Letting Fˆ denote the distribution function for the average valuation, we
infer that the demand for A’s system is 1− F̂ (v˜Aj ). Since the distribution of the average
valuation is more-peaked around ve than the distribution of the individual valuation for
any symmetric log-concave density f(·), we have 1− F̂ (v˜Aj ) > 1−F (v˜Aj ) for any v˜Aj < ve.
Hence, for given prices, incompatibility increases the demand for the dominant firm A
and decreases the demand for the dominated firm B.
Demand elasticity effect. After the regime changes from compatibility to incompatibil-
ity, the firms will have incentives to choose prices different from P+2 = 2p
+
2 and P
−
2 = 2p
−
2 .
Whether they want to charge higher or lower prices depends on how incompatibility affects
demand elasticity, which in turn depends on the valuation of the indifferent consumer and
hence on the level of the switching cost. For low levels of switching cost (that is, when
v˜Aj is not much smaller than ve), incompatibility makes the demand more elastic: a given
decrease in the average price of a system under incompatibility generates a higher boost in
demand than the same decrease in the price of each product under compatibility because
the distribution of the average valuation is more-peaked around ve than the distribution
of individual valuations. On the other hand, for high levels of switching cost (that is,
when v˜Aj is close to v), incompatibility makes the demand less elastic: because f̂(v)/f(v)
converges to zero as v tends to v, where f̂(·) is the density of the average valuation,
for v˜Aj close enough to v, we find that a given decrease in the average price of a system
generates a smaller boost in demand than the same decrease in the price of each product.
In summary, incompatibility changes the elasticity of demand such that firms compete
more aggressively for low levels of switching costs but less aggressively for high levels of
switching costs.
Second-period profit comparison. As a result of these two effects, we find the following
profit comparison:
12
Corollary 3. Let ∆v = 1 without loss of generality. Then, there are three threshold
values of switching cost, s1, s2, s3 with s1 < s2 < s3, such that
2pi+∗2 R Π+∗2 if and only if s Q s1(= 0.701);
2pi+∗2 + 2pi
−∗
2 R Π+∗2 + Π−∗2 if and only if s Q s2(= 0.825);
2pi−∗2 R Π−∗2 if and only if s Q s3(= 1.187).
0 0.5 1 1.5
s
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Π+ ∗2
Π−∗2
2π−∗2
2π+ ∗2
0.701 1.187
Figure 1: Second-period profits with or without compatibility
Although each of pi+∗2 , pi
−∗
2 , Π
+∗
2 , Π
−∗
2 depends on s, in what follows we do not highlight
this dependence unless it is necessary. Figure 1 shows 2pi+∗2 , 2pi
−∗
2 , Π
+∗
2 and Π
−∗
2 as a
function of s ∈ (0, 3/2), given ∆v = 1. There are three thresholds such that for s > 0.701
we have Π+∗2 > 2pi
+∗
2 , for s > 0.825 we have Π
+∗
2 + Π
−∗
2 > 2pi
+∗
2 + 2pi
−∗
2 , and for s > 1.187
we have Π−∗2 > 2pi
−∗
2 .
This result can be understood in view of the two effects introduced above. For low
switching costs (i.e., s close to zero), the demand size effect is negligible relative to the
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demand elasticity effect and the latter makes incompatibility intensify competition com-
pared to compatibility. Therefore, incompatibility reduces both firms’ profits. In partic-
ular, when s = 0, there is only the demand elasticity effect, which explains the result
of Matutes and Régibeau (1988) that incompatibility intensifies competition for symmet-
ric firms. For high switching costs (i.e., s close to 3/2), the demand size effect is again
negligible relative to the demand elasticity effect, but now the latter makes incompati-
bility soften competition compared to compatibility. Therefore, incompatibility increases
both firms’ profits. For intermediate level of switching costs, the demand elasticity effect
might be neutral but the demand size effect is positive for firm A and negative for firm
B. Therefore, incompatibility increases A’s profit but reduces B’s profit.
4 Model 1: once-and-for-all compatibility choices
In this section, we consider Model 1 of once-and-for-all compatibility choices. As the
second-period price competition is analyzed in Section 3, we examine here the first-period
price competition, considering myopic consumers; Section 6 shows that we obtain the
same results when we consider forward-looking consumers.
4.1 First-period price competition given a compatibility regime
4.1.1 Given compatibility
Suppose first that compatibility was chosen in the beginning of the first period. Given a
vector of the first-period prices
(
pi1,x, p
i
1,y, p
h
1,x, p
h
1,y
)
, firm i’s total profit is given as follows:
pii = di1,x(p
i
1,x + δpi
+∗
2 ) + (1− di1,x)(δpi−∗2 ) + di1,y(pi1,y + δpi+∗2 ) + (1− di1,y)(δpi−∗2 ), (3)
where di1,j represents demand for product j of firm i in period one (for j = x, y). From
the indifference condition pi1,j + tθj = ph1,j + t(1− θj) we derive di1,j:
di1,j =
1
2
+
1
2t
(ph1,j − pi1,j). (4)
We have:
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Proposition 1. Consider the model of once-and-for-all compatibility choices. Given com-
patibility, there exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric. The equilibrium prices
in the first period and each firm’s total equilibrium profit (per product) are given by
pi∗1j = t− δ
(
pi+∗2 − pi−∗2
) ≡ p∗1, for i = A,B and j = x, y. (5)
pii∗ =
t
2
+ δpi−∗2 ≡ pi∗ for i = A,B. (6)
Given compatibility, the pricing in (5) is quite intuitive. For δ = 0, each firm charges a
price per product equal to t as in a standard Hotelling model. For δ > 0, if firm i attracts
a consumer from the rival in the first period in a given product market, its expected profit
from the customer in the second period is pi+∗2 . But if the customer stays with the rival,
then firm i’s expected profit from that customer in the second period is pi−∗2 . Therefore,
each firm is ready to pay δ
(
pi+∗2 − pi−∗2
)
to attract a consumer from the rival. The profit
in (6) can be understood in a similar way. For δ = 0, each firm gets a profit of t/2 as in
a standard Hotelling model. For δ > 0, each firm’s profit from the second period is equal
to pi−∗2 as pi
+∗
2 − pi−∗2 is dissipated away during the first-period competition.
4.1.2 Given incompatibility
Suppose now that incompatibility was chosen in the beginning of the first period. Given
the first-period prices
(
P i1, P
h
1
)
, the firms’ profit functions are as follows:
Πi = Di1(P
i
1 +δΠ
+∗
2 )+(1−Di1)(δΠ−∗2 ), Πh = (1−Di1)(P h1 +δΠ+∗2 )+Di1(δΠ−∗2 ), (7)
where Di1 is firm i’s market share in period one and (from the indifference condition
P i1 + tθx + tθy = P
h
1 + t(1− θx) + t(1− θy)) is given by (for P h1 − 2t < P i1 < P h1 + 2t)
Di1 =
1
2
(
1 +
1
2t
(P h1 − P i1)
)2
− 1
4t2
(P h1 − P i1) max{0, P h1 − P i1}. (8)
We have:
Proposition 2. Consider the model of once-and-for-all compatibility choices. Given in-
compatibility, there exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric. The equilibrium
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prices in the first period and the firms’ total equilibrium profits are given by
P i∗1 = t− δ
(
Π+∗2 − Π−∗2
) ≡ P ∗1 for i = A,B. (9)
Πi∗ =
t
2
+ δΠ−∗2 ≡ Π∗, for i = A,B. (10)
Under incompatibility, if δ = 0, it is well-known from Matutes and Régibeau (1988)
that each firm charges a price for its system equal to t as in a two-dimensional Hotelling
model. For δ > 0, if firm i attracts a consumer from the rival in the first period, its
expected profit from the customer in the second period is Π+∗2 . But if the customer stays
with the rival, then firm i’s expected profit from him in the second period is Π−∗2 . There-
fore, each firm is ready to pay δ
(
Π+∗2 − Π−∗2
)
to attract a consumer, which is dissipated
away. For this reason, each firm’s equilibrium profit is t
2
+ δΠ−∗2 .
4.2 Compatibility choice
From Propositions 1 and 2, each firm chooses incompatibility if and only if t
2
+ δΠ−∗2 >
t+ δ2pi−∗2 , which is equivalent to δ
(
Π−∗2 − 2pi−∗2
)
> t
2
. Hence, we have:
Proposition 3. Consider the model of once-and-for-all compatibility choice.
(i) If δ
(
Π−∗2 − 2pi−∗2
)
< t
2
, there exists an equilibrium in which both firms choose com-
patibility. This equilibrium Pareto-dominates the equilibrium in which both firms choose
incompatibility.
(ii) If δ
(
Π−∗2 − 2pi−∗2
)
> t
2
, there exists a unique equilibrium and it is such that both
firms choose incompatibility.
Incompatibility intensifies competition between symmetric firms in a one-period game.
Precisely, when δ = 0, incompatibility reduces each firm’s total profit from t to t/2,
which is well-known from Matutes and Régibeau (1988). Proposition 3(i) generalizes their
result for δ
t
small enough: as long as δ
t
is small enough, the firms choose compatibility
because this softens competition in period one and the second-period profits are relatively
unimportant.
Proposition 3(ii) shows that the finding of Matutes and Régibeau (1988) is reversed if
both the switching cost and the weight of the second period are large enough. Precisely,
if s > s¯3, then Π−∗2 > 2pi
−∗
2 . Then, the firms choose incompatibility for high
δ
t
since
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incompatibility softens competition in period two. Even if part of the increased second-
period profit is dissipated away during the first-period competition, each firm retains
δ(Π−∗2 − 2pi−∗2 ) in terms of increased profit, which more than compensates the reduction
of t/2 in the first-period profit if δ
t
is large.
We assumed uniform distribution of valuations, but Proposition 3 can be extended
to the family of symmetric log-concave densities. This is because Hurkens, Jeon and
Menicucci (2018) show that, for this family, Π−∗2 > 2pi
−∗
2 holds for a switching cost (i.e.,
a dominance level in their paper) larger than some threshold.
5 Model 2: dynamic compatibility choices
In this section, we consider Model 2 in which each firm makes a compatibility choice
in each period. We study Model 2 for two different reasons. First, we want to check
the robustness of the prediction from Model 1 (i.e., Proposition 3). This can be done
in two different ways. Obviously, we can compare the equilibrium compatibility choices
across both models. Furthermore, we can study the second-period compatibility choice
that emerges in Model 2 for a given first-period compatibility regime. We find that the
prediction of Model 1 is robust in both regards.
Second, Model 2 reveals some interesting dynamics of compatibility choices that arise
because of the interaction between compatibility choices and poaching. This result is
clearly seen when we study the second-period compatibility choice for a given first-period
market outcome.
5.1 Second-period price competition and compatibility choice
5.1.1 Second-period price competition
Lemma 1 can be applied to the second-period price competition in each market ij as long
as there is compatibility in period two, independently of the first-period compatibility
regime. Similarly, Lemma 2 can be applied to each market (i, i) as long as there is incom-
patibility in period two, independently of the first-period compatibility regime. Therefore,
what remains to be studied is the competition under incompatibility in the market (i, h)
composed of the consumers who have bought a hybrid system in period one. This com-
petition arises only if the firms chose compatibility in period one and incompatibility in
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period two.
We normalize the total mass of consumers in market (i, h) to one. A consumer with
valuations
(
vix, v
h
y
)
is indifferent between buying (i, i) and (h, h) if and only if
vix + v
e − P i2(i, h)− s = ve + vhy − P h2 (i, h)− s. (11)
Note that s cancels out in (11). It turns out that the demand for firm i’s system is identical
to the demand for its system in market (i, i) when s = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 3).
Therefore, Lemma 3 below is a special case of Lemma 2. As the two firms are symmetric
in this market, we have a symmetric equilibrium. We introduce simplifying notation:
P 0∗2 = P
i∗
2 (i, h) = P
h∗
2 (i, h), Π
0∗
2 = Π
i∗
2 (i, h) = Π
h∗
2 (i, h),
where the superscript 0 refers to the fact that no firm has any advantage in market (i, h).
We have:
Lemma 3. Suppose that compatibility was chosen in period one while incompatibility was
chosen in period two. Consider the period-two competition in the market composed of the
consumers who bought the hybrid system (A,B) (or (B,A)) in period one. We normalize
to one the total mass of consumers in this market. There exists a unique equilibrium,
which is symmetric and such that
(i) the equilibrium price for each firm is P 0∗2 =
∆v
2
;
(ii) each firm’s second-period profit from this market is Π0∗2 =
∆v
4
.
Note that we have
Π0∗2 = Π
+∗
2 (0) = Π
−∗
2 (0).
As 2pi+∗2 +2pi
−∗
2 > Π
+∗
2 +Π
−∗
2 when s = 0 and both 2pi
+∗
2 +2pi
−∗
2 and Π
+∗
2 +Π
−∗
2 are strictly
increasing, it follows that the second-period competition in market (A,B) or (B,A) under
incompatibility is more intensive than the competition in market (A,A) or (B,B) under
incompatibility and the competition in any product market under compatibility.
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5.1.2 Second-period compatibility choice
To shorten the main texts, we move the detailed analysis of the second-period compat-
ibility choice to Appendix where Lemma 4 (Lemma 5) describes our findings given the
first-period compatibility (incompatibility). We below provide a summary of the main
findings (see also Figure 2). Basically, we can distinguish two cases depending on whether
or not the first-period market shares affect the second-period compatibility choice.
Figure 2: Compatibility choice in period 2 given a compatibility regime in period 1
• Case 1: the second-period compatibility choice is determined independently of the
first-period market shares
– For low switching cost (i.e., s < s1), both firms always choose compatibility in
period two independently of the compatibility regime of the first-period.
– Given the first-period incompatibility, for high switching cost (i.e., s > s2), at
least one firm chooses incompatibility in period two.
• Case 2: the second-period compatibility choice depends on the first-period market
shares
– Given the first-period incompatibility, for intermediate switching cost (i.e., s1 ≤
s < s2), compatibility emerges in period two if the firms’ first-period market
shares are not too different; otherwise, incompatibility emerges in period two.
19
– Given the first-period compatibility, for high switching cost (i.e., s > s1),
incompatibility emerges in period two if and only if one firm’s first-period
market share in both products is close to one.
The first finding of Case 1 results simply from the fact that 2pi+∗2 > Π
+∗
2 , 2pi
−∗
2 > Π
−∗
2
for s < s1, that is both firms prefer compatibility in the second period. The second finding
of Case 1 is obtained because given the first-period incompatibility and s > s2, the second
period industry profit is higher with incompatibility. Therefore, at least the firm with a
weakly larger (first-period) market share prefers incompatibility in the second period.
Consider now the first finding of Case 2, the first-period incompatibility with s1 ≤
s < s2. If the firms have similar market shares, then s < s2 implies that both prefer
compatibility. But if one firm has a much larger market share, then s1 ≤ s implies that
the firm prefers incompatibility. Consider now the case of the first-period compatibility
with s > s1. As the second-period incompatibility intensifies competition in the market
for the consumers who bought a hybrid system in period one, the firms choose incompat-
ibility only if the size of these markets is small enough, which happens if one firm has a
large (first-period) market share in both markets. Conversely, if the first-period market
shares are more or less symmetric, the first-period compatibility leads to the second-period
compatibility.
In summary, the interaction between compatibility choices and poaching generates an
interesting asymmetry in the dynamics of compatibility choices. For a low switching cost,
there is no path dependency in that the firms end up choosing compatibility in period two
no matter the compatibility regime in period one. In contrast, for high switching cost, we
have path dependency if the shares of the hybrid markets are significant enough under
the first-period compatibility. Then, compatibility (incompatibility) in period one leads
to compatibility (incompatibility) in period two. This path dependency arises even if we
make the first-period market shares endogenous: namely, according to Proposition 4(ii)
and Proposition 5, we have such path dependency for s > s2 as long as δ is small enough.
5.2 First-period price competition
In this subsection, we study the first-period price competition given a first-period com-
patibility regime. The analysis is relatively straightforward in the case in which the
second-period compatibility choice is determined independently of the first-period market
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shares, because then first-period price competition has no dynamic effect. The analysis
is more involved in the case in which the first-period market shares has an impact on the
second-period compatibility choices. For this reason, we start by analyzing the regime of
the first-period incompatibility.
5.2.1 Given incompatibility in the first period
We below present a proposition that covers s < s1 and s ≥ s2; in both cases, the second-
period compatibility choice does not depend on the first-period market shares.
Proposition 4. Suppose that incompatibility was chosen in the first period. Let ∆v = 1
without loss of generality.
(i) If Π+∗2 < 2pi
+∗
2 (i.e., if s < s1), there exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric
and such that
P i∗1 = t− δ
(
2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2
)
for i = A,B.
Both firms choose compatibility in the second period. Each firm’s total profit is
Πi∗ =
t
2
+ δ2pi−∗2 for i = A,B.
(ii) If 2pi+∗2 +2pi
−∗
2 ≤ Π+∗2 +Π−∗2 (i.e., if s ≥ s2), there exists a unique equilibrium, which
is symmetric and PA∗i = PB∗i = P ∗1 from (9). Both firms choose incompatibility in
the second period and each firm’s total profit is Π∗ as described in Proposition 2.
Consider first Proposition 4(ii) which considers s ≥ s2. It is similar to Proposition
2, as both yield the same equilibrium prices and profits. Of course, a major difference is
that the second-period compatibility choice is endogenous in Proposition 4(ii) while it is
exogenous in Proposition 2.
Proposition 4(i) considers s < s1 and describes a change in the compatibility regime
over the two periods. However, the equilibrium prices and profits it identifies can be
explained by arguments very similar to those provided after Proposition 1 and 2.
Finally, if s is between s1 and s2, then the compatibility regime in period two depends
on the first-period market shares: compatibility emerges if the first-period market shares
are not too different. In the Appendix, we provide Proposition 13, which shows that if
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a pure strategy equilibrium exists, then the prices are the same as in Proposition 4(i),
compatibility prevails in the second period, and that the equilibrium exists if δ/t ≤ rIC(s)
for a suitable function rIC defined in the appendix.
5.2.2 Given compatibility in the first period
If compatibility was chosen in period one, then for s ≤ s1, compatibility arises also
in period two independently of the first-period market shares. Hence, there exists an
equilibrium which is outcome-equivalent to the equilibrium described by Proposition 1.
Next proposition establishes that such equilibrium exists also if s > s¯1 and δ/t is small.
Proposition 5. Suppose that compatibility was chosen in the first period. Then, there
exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric, if and only if Π+∗2 − 2pi+∗2 ≤ tδ . In the
equilibrium, each firm chooses compatibility in the second period. The equilibrium prices
in the first period and the firms’ profits are as described in Proposition 1.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 5 may not exists if s > s1 because for a
firm it may be profitable to induce incompatibility in the second period by choosing low
prices and cornering both markets in the first period. Indeed, for δ large, this is the
best deviation as there are economies of scale under the second-period incompatibility.
In order to corner both markets, the deviating firm should charge p∗1 − t in period one;
then it obtains a profit of Π+∗2 in period two and a total profit of δ
[
Π+∗2 − 2
(
pi+∗2 − pi−∗2
)]
.
Therefore, the cornering deviation is not profitable if the deviation profit is smaller than
t + δ2pi−∗2 , which is equivalent to Π
+∗
2 − 2pi+∗2 ≤ tδ . This inequality is obviously satisfied
for s ≤ s1, but for s > s1 it fails to hold if δ
t
is high and then the equilibrium described
by Proposition 5 fails to exist.
However, when s > s3 there exists a cornering equilibrium if δ/t is large. In this
equilibrium, one firm charges a price p¯ < 0 (i.e., below the marginal cost) in each market
and the other firm charges p¯+t. Hence, the first firm has full market share in both markets
in period one and chooses incompatibility in period two, with a total profit of 2p¯+ δΠ+∗2 .
The other firm has zero market share in both markets in period one and its total profit is
δΠ−∗2 . The value of p¯ must be small enough in order to discourage the cornered firm from
earning a positive market share in period one, but high enough to deter the cornering
firm from reducing its period-one market share in order to reduce its period-one losses.
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Since the possible deviations are somewhat intricate to describe,12 stating precisely the
conditions under which this equilibrium exists is complicated, except that for each s > s3
there exists rCI(s) such that a cornering equilibrium exists if and only if δt ≥ rCI(s). A δt
sufficiently high is needed because each firm makes zero or negative profit in period one,
and a large δ
t
discourages deviations in period one that yield a positive profit in period one
but reduce the profit in period two.13 Moreover, we find that rCI(s) is between 3/2Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
and 16/9
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
.
Proposition 6. Suppose that compatibility was chosen in the first period, and assume
Π−∗2 − 2pi−∗2 > 0. Then there exists a cornering equilibrium if and only if δt ≥ rCI(s).
Precisely,
(i) in the first period, in both markets one firm charges price p¯ = γ − δ
2
(Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 )
(for a suitable γ in (0, t)) and the other firm charges price p¯+ t; hence the first firm
corners both markets;
(ii) in the second period, incompatibility is chosen at least by the firm who cornered the
markets, which earns a total profit of 2γ+δΠ−∗2 ; the other firm’s total profit is δΠ
−∗
2 .
5.3 First-period compatibility choice
In the previous subsection we have analyzed the first-period price competition given a first-
period compatibility regime. We now study the firms’ first-period compatibility choices.
Let us normalize ∆v to one without loss of generality. If the switching cost is low enough
(i.e., s < s1), then by Proposition 4(i) and Proposition 5, the firms choose compatibility in
period two no matter the compatibility regime in period one. As compatibility in period
one generates a higher first-period profit than incompatibility (see Propositions 4(i) and
5), the firms will choose compatibility also in period one.
Suppose now that the switching cost is high enough (i.e., s > s3). Then, incompatibil-
ity in period one leads to incompatibility in period two, with the profit of t
2
+δΠ−∗2 for each
firm (see Proposition 4(ii)). Regarding the case of compatibility in period one, we have
12They might include the choice of the deviating firm to include compatibility in period two.
13Such deviations lead to compatibility in period two, thus reducing each firm’s profit in period two as
s > s¯3.
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to distinguish δ/t small from δ/t large. If δ/t is small (i.e., δ
t
≤ 1
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
), compatibility
in period one leads to compatibility in period two by Proposition 5. In this case, each
firm’s profit is t+ δ2pi−∗2 . Since
1
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
< 1
2(Π−∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
for each s ∈ (s3, 3
2
), it follows that
δ
t
≤ 1
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
implies δ
t
< 1
2(Π−∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
, that is t+δ2pi−∗2 >
t
2
+δΠ−∗2 and therefore the firms
choose compatibility for δ/t small. If δ/t is large enough (i.e., larger than rCI(s)), then
compatibility in period one leads to incompatibility in period two through the cornering
equilibrium described in Proposition 6. In such an equilibrium, the cornered firm earns
δΠ−∗2 , which is less then
t
2
+ δΠ−∗2 . Therefore, such a firm will choose incompatibility in
period one.
Proposition 7 below covers values of parameters such that a pure strategy equilibrium
exists given either compatibility regime in period one. We have
Proposition 7. (first-period compatibility choice) Consider the model in which each firm
makes a compatibility choice in every period.
(i) If either the switching cost is low enough to satisfy 2pi+∗2 ≥ Π+∗2 (i.e., s ≤ s1), or
if δ/t is small enough to satisfy δ/t ≤ 1
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
(and, furthermore, δ/t ≤ rIC(s)
for s ∈ (s¯1, s¯2)) then there is a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric. In the
equilibrium, the firms choose compatibility in both periods.
(ii) If both the switching cost and δ/t are high enough to satisfy Π−∗2 > 2pi
−∗
2 and δ/t ≥
rCI(s), then there is a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric and such that the
firms choose incompatibility in both periods.
5.4 Comparison: Model 1 vs. Model 2
We now compare Proposition 3 from Model 1 with Proposition 7 from Model 2. Note first
that the two models generate quite similar predictions. If δ
t
and the switching cost are large
enough (i.e., if s > s¯3 and δ
t
> 1
2(Π−∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
holds), then the incompatibility equilibrium
arises in both models since rCI(s) < 12(Π−∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
. Similarly, if either the switching cost
is low enough (i.e., s ≤ s1) to satisfy 2pi+∗2 ≥ Π+∗2 , or s > s¯1 and δ/t is small enough to
satisfy δ/t ≤ 1
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
(plus δ
t
≤ r¯IC(s) if s ∈ (s¯1, s¯2)), then the compatibility equilibrium
arises in both models.
When we focus on the differences between the two propositions, we find that the
incompatibility equilibrium arises in Model 2 more frequently than in Model 1. In order to
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see why, notice that in Model 1 the incompatibility equilibrium emerges if and only if each
firm’s profit under incompatibility, t
2
+ δΠ−∗2 , is larger than the one under compatibility,
t + δ2pi−∗2 . In Model 2, the incompatibility equilibrium arises as long as the cornering
equilibrium exists given compatibility in period one, since this induces at least one firm
to choose incompatibility in period one. This occurs if and only if δ
t
≥ rCI(s), and since
rCI(s) <
1
2(Π−∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
, the incompatibility equilibrium is found more frequently in Model
2 than in Model 1.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 8. (i) In both models, the compatibility equilibrium arises if the switching
cost is low enough (i.e., s ≤ s1) or if δ/t is small enough to satisfy δ/t ≤ 1
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
for
s ∈ (s¯1, 3
2
) (plus δ
t
≤ r¯IC(s) if s ∈ (s¯1, s¯2)). In both models, the incompatibility equilibrium
arises if δ
t
and the switching cost are large enough (i.e., if s > s¯3 and Π−∗2 − 2pi−∗2 > t2δ
holds).
(ii) If the incompatibility equilibrium arises in Model 1, it arises also in Model 2. But
there are parameter values under which the incompatibility equilibrium arises in the latter
while it does not in the former.
6 Forward-looking consumers
Up to now, we have assumed that consumers are myopic. We here show that if consumers
were forward-looking, our results remain unaffected in Model 1 and remain qualitatively
similar in Model 2.
First notice that our analysis of the second period continues to apply regardless of
whether consumers are myopic or forward-looking. Second, in Model 2 of dynamic com-
patibility choices, each single consumer knows in period one that he cannot be pivotal
in influencing the firms’ second-period compatibility choices since he is an infinitesimal
fraction of the population of consumers. Then, taking as given the compatibility regimes
in period one and two, we inquire how forward-looking consumers make their purchases
in period one.
It is simple to see that if a consumer in period one expects compatibility to prevail
period two, then his expected second-period utility does not depend on which products
he buys in period one. Precisely, if he buys product j from firm i in period one, then his
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utility in period two is the expectation of max{vij−p+∗2 , ve−p−∗2 −s}; if he buys product j
from firm h in period one, then his utility is the expectation of max{vhj −p+∗2 , ve−p−∗2 −s}.
Since vij and vhj are identically distributed, it follows that the two expectations are equal,
and the consumer will choose in period one on the basis of his first-period utility, as a
myopic consumer does. The same principle holds if incompatibility prevails in period
one, and a consumers expects that it will be maintained in period two as well. If a
consumer chooses the system of firm i in period one, then his payoff in period two is
equal to the expectation of max{vix + viy − P+∗2 , 2ve − P−∗2 − 2s}. If he buys the system
of firm h in period one, then his payoff in period two is equal to the expectation of
max{vhx + vhy − P+∗2 , 2ve − P−∗2 − 2s}. Since the distribution of vix + viy is the same as the
distribution of vhx + vhy , the two expectations are equal and the consumer will choose in
period one on the basis of his period one utility, as a myopic consumer does. This proves
that in Model 1 of once-and-for-all compatibility choices, a forward-looking consumer
behaves exactly the same as a myopic consumer.
Proposition 9. (forward-looking consumers) Suppose that consumers are forward-looking.
In Model 1 of once-and-for-all compatibility choices, forward-looking consumers behave in
the same way as myopic consumers do.
However, things are quite different if compatibility prevails in period one, and a con-
sumer expects incompatibility to prevail in period two. In this case, if a consumer buys
both products of firm i in period one, then he obtains a payoff in period two equal to the ex-
pectation of max{vix+viy−P+∗2 , 2ve−P−∗2 −2s} ≡ uii2 , which is equal to uhh2 . Conversely, if in
period one a consumer buys product x from firm i and product y from firm h, then his pay-
off in period two is equal to the expectation of max{vix+ve−∆v2 −s, vhy +ve−∆v2 −s} ≡ uih2 ,
which is equal to uhi2 . The inequality uii2 < uih2 holds since (as we previously noted in
section 5.1.1) second-period competition under incompatibility is more intensive in the
market of the consumers who bought a hybrid system than in the market of the con-
sumers who bought a pure system. This implies that given compatibility in period one,
a forward-looking consumer who expects incompatibility in period two makes more fre-
quently hybrid purchases in period one than a myopic consumer does. However, given
incompatibility in period one, there is no difference in behavior between forward-looking
consumers and myopic consumers no matter the second-period compatibility regime which
they expect to prevail.
26
Consider now the compatibility equilibrium of Proposition 3(i) and Proposition 7(i).
In Model 1, this equilibrium exists when it is robust to a deviation starting with the
first-period incompatibility. In Model 2 with myopic consumers, the equilibrium exists
if it is robust to, in addition to the aforementioned deviation, a deviation in which the
first-period compatibility is followed by the second-period incompatibility. Now consider
Model 2 with forward-looking consumers. Compared to the case of myopic consumers,
the deviation starting with first-period incompatibility is unaffected but the deviation in
which the first-period compatibility is followed by the second-period incompatibility is
less profitable. These arguments imply (i) if the compatibility equilibrium arises in Model
2 with myopic consumers, it arises also in Model 2 with forward-looking consumers; (ii) if
the compatibility equilibrium arises in Model 2 with forward-looking consumers, it arises
also in Model 1.
Consider now the incompatibility equilibrium of Proposition 3(ii) and Proposition
7(ii). In Model 1, this equilibrium exists when it generates a payoff larger than the one
obtained when both firms choose compatibility. In Model 2 with myopic consumers, for
relevant parameter values, the first-period compatibility leads to a cornering equilibrium
inducing incompatibility in period two. The incompatibility equilibrium exists when it
generates a payoff larger than the one obtained by the cornered firm in the cornering
equilibrium. In Model 2 with forward-looking consumers, compared to the case of myopic
consumers, the first-period compatibility is likely to lead less frequently to the equilibrium
in which one firm gains sufficient market shares to choose incompatibility in period two
because of uii2 < uih2 . Therefore, there are two possibilities: the relevant payoff conditional
on the first-period compatibility is either the one from a symmetric equilibrium leading to
the second-period compatibility or the one from an asymmetric equilibrium leading to the
second-period incompatibility. In the former case, the incompatibility equilibrium exists
in Model 2 with forward-looking consumers if and only if it exists in Model 1. In the
latter case, the incompatibility equilibrium would exist in Model 2 with forward-looking
consumers more frequently than in Model 1 but less frequently than in Model 2 with
myopic consumers.
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7 Consumer surplus and welfare
In both models, we have, as pure strategy equilibrium, either the equilibrium in which
compatibility is chosen in both periods or the equilibrium in which incompatibility is
chosen in both periods. In this section we compare, in terms of consumer surplus and
welfare, the allocation that competition generates when compatibility is maintained in
both periods with the one when incompatibility is maintained in both periods. Without
loss of generality, we normalize ∆v to one.
7.1 Consumer surplus
In period one, consumer surplus is greater under incompatibility than under compatibility
for any s and δ
t
for two reasons. The first reason is known from Matutes and Régibeau
(1988): for symmetric firms, incompatibility intensifies first-period competition. As we
explained in Section 3.3, this has to do with the demand elasticity effect of incompatibility.
Even if incompatibility increases transportation costs incurred by consumers, this effect
is dominated by the effect from more intensive competition. The second reason is that
the difference between the dominant firm’s second-period profit and the dominated one’s
profit is greater under incompatibility than under compatibility, that is we have
Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 > 2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 for any s ∈ (0,
3
2
).
Hence, under incompatibility, the firms dissipate more the second-period profit from
locked-in consumers by competing more aggressively in period one.
Consumer surplus in period two depends on s. For instance, consider a consumer who
bought both goods from firm A in period one. Then, for large values of s, we find that
P+∗2 > 2p
+∗
2 , P
−∗
2 > 2p
−∗
2 , P
+∗
2 > p
+∗
2 + p
−∗
2 since incompatibility softens competition
in period two with respect to compatibility. In particular, the first inequality implies
that if this consumer buys both goods from A in period two, then he is better off under
compatibility than under incompatibility; in fact we find that for any possible realization
of
(
vAx , v
A
y
)
, this consumer is better off under compatibility. As a consequence, the second-
period consumer surplus is higher under compatibility for large s (i.e., for s > 0.876).
Conversely, for s close to zero the opposite inequalities hold: P+∗2 < 2p
+∗
2 , P
−∗
2 < 2p
−∗
2 ,
P+∗2 < p
+∗
2 + p
−∗
2 . The second-period consumer surplus is higher under incompatibility
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for s < 0.876.
Let CSI (CSC) denote the total consumer surplus under incompatibility (compatibil-
ity). The previous arguments seem to suggest that CSC > CSI when s > 0.876 and δ
t
is
large. But in fact, we need to take into account that an increase in δ reduces both 2p∗1
and (especially) P ∗1 . Hence, we find CSC > CSI if s > 1.168 and
δ
t
is above a suitable
threshold, which we denote rS(s). It is given by
rS(s) =
5
6
(
2pi+∗2 − pi−∗2 − 2p+∗2 + P+∗2 − Π+∗2 + 13Π−∗2
) .
Note that there is a minor difference between the two models: precisely, Proposition
3 proves that incompatibility arises in Model 1 if and only if s > s¯3(≡ 1.187) and δ
t
>
1
2(Π−∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
, whereas Proposition 7 establishes that incompatibility arises in Model 2 if
s > s¯3 and δ
t
≥ rCI(s). We find that
rCI(s) < rS(s) <
1
2(Π−∗2 − 2pi−∗2 )
.
Therefore, whenever incompatibility emerges in Model 1, it necessarily reduces consumer
surplus relative to compatibility. Conversely, in Model 2, there exist parameter values (i.e.,
δ, t such that rCI(s) < δt < rS(s)) such that firms choose incompatibility and CS
I > CSC .
Similar properties hold with respect to compatibility: in both models, when compatibility
arises in equilibrium, it is often the case that CSI > CSC .
We have:
Proposition 10. (consumer surplus) (i) Consumer surplus under compatibility is
CSC = 2[ve − p∗1 −
1
4
t+ δ(ve − p+∗2 +
1
2
pi−∗2 )]
(ii) Consumer surplus under incompatibility is
CSI = 2ve − P ∗1 −
2
3
t+ δ(2ve − P+∗2 +
2
3
Π−∗2 )]
(iii) The inequality CSC > CSI holds if and only if s > 1.168 and δ
t
> rS(s). Whenever
incompatibility arises in equilibrium in Model 1, it always implies CSC > CSI ; in Model 2,
it implies CSC > CSI if δ
t
> rS(s) and CSC < CSI if δt < rS(s). Whenever compatibility
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arises in equilibrium, CSI > CSC for s < 1.168 regardless of the model.
What is remarkable is the conflict between the firms’ compatibility choice and con-
sumer surplus: except for a very small range of parameters, whenever the firms choose
incompatibility (compatibility), it reduces CS compared to compatibility (incompatibil-
ity). This is because the firms choose (in)compatibility in order to soften competition,
which hurts consumer surplus.
7.2 Social welfare
We start by describing the first-best allocation that maximizes social welfare. In period
one, the first–best requires a consumer of location θj for good j (j = x, y) to buy good Aj
if θj < 12 and to buy good Bj if θj >
1
2
. In period two, the first-best requires a consumer
who purchased good j of A (for instance) in period one and observes vAj to keep buying
good j from A if vAj > ve− s and to switch to B if vAj < ve− s. In particular, notice that
no switching should occur in period two if s ≥ 1
2
.
Under compatibility, the first-period allocation coincides with the welfare-maximizing
allocation, whereas the second period allocation is inefficient (as we noticed after Lemma
1) since p+∗2 > p
−∗
2 implies that too much switching occurs. However, this efficiency loss
is small if s is close to zero or if s is close to 3
2
. In the former case, we have p+∗2 close
to p−∗2 . In the latter case, maximizing the second-period welfare requires no switching
and the second-period allocation under compatibility is such that the market share of the
poaching firm (i.e., the proportion of switching consumers) tends to 0 as s tends to 3
2
.
Incompatibility generates an allocation which is inefficient in both periods. In period
one, consumers cannot mix and match, which increases the transportation costs they
incur. In period two, likewise, incompatibility forces consumers to make switching de-
cisions only at a system level, which prevents it from reaching the first-best. However,
for some intermediate values of s (i.e., for s ∈ (0.535, 1.152)), the second-period social
welfare is higher under incompatibility than under compatibility. This occurs because for
these values of s, no switching maximizes social welfare and the market share of the dom-
inant firm is significantly larger under incompatibility than under compatibility precisely
because of the demand size effect of incompatibility explained in Section 3.3. As a conse-
quence, total social welfare is greater under incompatibility than under compatibility for
s ∈ (0.535, 1.152) if δ/t is large since the superior performance of incompatibility in period
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two dominates its inefficiency in period one. Conversely, if s < 0.535 or s > 1.152, then
social welfare is greater in both periods under compatibility than under incompatibility.
From Propositions 3 and 7, we see that s > s¯3 is a necessary condition for incompat-
ibility to emerge in equilibrium regardless of the model. Since s¯3 > 1.152, we conclude
that whenever the firms choose incompatibility, this necessarily reduces social welfare.
When the firms choose compatibility, this choice generates a higher social welfare except
for the case in which s ∈ (0.535, 1.152) and δ/t is large. Summarizing, we have
Proposition 11. (welfare) (i) Social welfare under compatibility is
SWC = 2[ve − p∗1 +
3
4
t+ δ(ve − p+∗2 +
5
2
pi−∗2 )].
(ii) Social welfare given under incompatibility is
SW I = 2ve − P ∗1 +
1
3
t+ δ(2ve − P+∗2 +
8
3
Π−∗2 )].
(iii) The inequality SW I > SWC holds if and only if s ∈ (0.535, 1.152) and δ
t
>
1
6(Π+∗2 + 53Π
−∗
2 −P+∗2 −(2pi+∗2 +3pi−∗2 −2p+∗2 ))
. Whenever incompatibility arises in equilibrium, SW I <
SWC holds regardless of the model. When compatibility arises in equilibrium, SWC >
SW I holds except when s ∈ (0.535, 1.152) and δ
t
> 1
6(Π+∗2 + 53Π
−∗
2 −P+∗2 −(2pi+∗2 +3pi−∗2 −2p+∗2 ))
.
8 Extension: growing vs mature market
We here consider a simple extension of Model 1 in order to study how the compatibility
choices are affected by whether the market is growing or mature. For this purpose, we
assume that in the second period, a measure σ > 0 of new consumers appears. They
live only one period and the market for the new consumers is modeled as the market in
period one. As the firms can apply behavior-based price discrimination, the firms can offer
targeted prices to these consumers. Therefore, each firm’s profit from the new consumers
is σt under second-period compatibility and σt/2 under second-period incompatibility.
Hence, the firms will choose compatibility in period one if
t+ δ
[
2pi−∗2 + σt
]
> t/2 + δ
[
Π−∗2 + σt/2
]
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and choose incompatibility otherwise. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 12. Suppose that the firms make once-and-for-all compatibility choices in
period one and that there is a measure σ > 0 of new consumers who arrive in the second
period. Then the firms choose compatibility if t + δ
[
2pi−∗2 + σt
]
> t/2 + δ
[
Π−∗2 + σt/2
]
holds and choose incompatibility otherwise. Therefore, compatibility is more likely to be
chosen in a growing market than in a mature market.
The above proposition generates an interesting prediction that platforms are more
likely to embrace compatibility in a growing market than in a mature market.
9 Conclusion
Our paper captures well Larry Page’s claim of an "island-like" Internet. Consumers’ data
are stocked in platforms’ data center and consumers access them through cloud. As plat-
forms typically own such data and moving data across platforms is hard, consumer lock-in
arises very naturally.14 Then, our theory predicts that platforms embrace incompatibility
today in order to soften future competition even if this intensifies today’s competition.
Therefore, incompatibility hurts consumers. It also reduces welfare by making switching
at product level impossible.
Our results are derived when any second-period rent from locked-in consumers is
completely dissipated away during the first-period competition. In reality, such full pass-
through of rent to consumers seems unlikely. If pass-through is partial and hence some
rent is retained, this will further expand the regime of incompatibility, strengthening our
conclusion.
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11 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The demand for product j of firm i in market ij is given by:
d+2 =

1 if p+2 < s− ∆v2 + p−2
1
2
+ 1
∆v
(s+ p−2 − p+2 ) if s− ∆v2 + p−2 ≤ p+2 ≤ s+ ∆v2 + p−2
0 if s+ ∆v
2
+ p−2 < p
+
2
(12)
and the demand for product j of firm h is d−2 = 1− d+2 .
(i) By definition of equilibrium, p+∗2 maximizes p
+
2 d
+
2 and p
−∗
2 maximizes p
−
2 d
−
2 . Hence,
the following F.O.C. need to hold (they are sufficient as p+2 d
+
2 is concave in p
+
2 , and p
−
2 d
−
2
is concave in p−2 ):
− p
+
2
∆v
+ d+2 = 0⇔
∆v
2
+ s+ p−2 − 2p+2 = 0
− p
−
2
∆v
+ d−2 = 0⇔
∆v
2
− s− 2p−2 + p+2 = 0
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This implies p+∗2 =
∆v
2
+ s
3
, p−∗2 =
∆v
2
− s
3
.
(ii) Using (12), and the equilibrium prices, we have pi+∗2 =
1
∆v
(
∆v
2
+ s
3
)2, pi−∗2 = 1∆v (∆v2 − s3)2.
Proof of Lemma 2
The demand function for firm h’s system is given by (for −∆v < P+2 −P−2 −2s < ∆v)
D−2 =
1
2(∆v)2
[
∆v − 2s− P−2 + P+2
]2− 1
(∆v)2
(P+2 −P−2 −2s) max{0, P+2 −P−2 −2s}, (13)
and D+2 = 1−D−2 is the demand for the system of firm i.
(i) The equilibrium prices maximize D+2 P
+
2 and D
−
2 P
−
2 , which implies the F.O.C.
P+2 = 2s−∆v + 3P−2 , and −8(P−2 )2 − 2(2s−∆v)P−2 + ∆v2 = 0.15 These yield P+∗2 and
P−∗2 in Lemma 2(i).
(ii) Substituting the equilibrium prices in (13) yields the equilibrium demands and
eventually the equilibrium second-period profits in Lemma 2(ii).
Proof of Proposition 1
Given compatibility, the total profit of firm i from product j is:
di1,jp
i
1,j + δ
(
di1,jpi
+∗
2 + (1− di1,j)pi−∗2
)
(14)
where di1,j in (4) is the first-period demand. From (14) we obtain the first order condition
di1,j −
1
2t
(pi1,j + δpi
+∗
2 − δpi−∗2 ) = 0
A similar first order condition, dh1,j − 12t(ph1,j + δpi+∗2 − δpi−∗2 ) = 0, needs to hold for firm
h.16 Solving then, we find the first-period equilibrium prices in Proposition 1, and the
equilibrium profits are obtained by replacing equilibrium prices in (14).
15Since D−2 is such that
∂D−2 /∂P
−
2
D−2
is negative and decreasing in P−2 (i.e., D
−
2 is log-concave in P
−
2 ),
satisfying the first order condition relative to P−2 D
−
2 suffices to maximize P
−
2 D
−
2 with respect to P
−
2 . A
similar remark applies to the maximization of P+2 D
+
2 with respect to P
+
2 .
16As in Lemma 1, these first order conditions are sufficient since the profit functions are concave.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Assume without loss of generality that the equilibrium first-period prices, P i∗1 , P h∗1 ,
satisfy P i∗1 ≥ P h∗1 . Then given the profit functions in (7), with Di1 in (8), P i∗1 , P h∗1 solve
the F.O.C. given by17[
1 +
1
2t
(P h1 − P i1)
] [
P i1 + δ
(
Π+∗2 − Π−∗2
)]− 2tDi1 = 0[
1 +
1
2t
(P h1 − P i1)
] [
P h1 + δ
(
Π+∗2 − Π−∗2
)]− 2tDh1 = 0
The unique solution is P i∗1 = P h∗1 = t− δ
(
Π+∗2 − Π−∗2
)
.18 From (7), the equilibrium profit
for each firm is 1
2
(t− δ (Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 )+ δΠ+∗2 ) + 12(δΠ−∗2 ) = t2 + δΠ−∗2 .
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is omitted as it is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 3
The demand for firm i’s system is given by (for P h −∆v < P i < P h + ∆v)
Di2(i, h) =
1
2(∆v)2
[
∆v − P i2(i, h) + P h2 (i, h)
]2− 1
(∆v)2
[
P h2 (i, h)− P i2(i, h)
]
max{0, P h2 (i, h)−P i2(i, h)}
(15)
and Dh2 (i, h) = 1−Di2(i, h) is the demand function for firm h’s system. Notice that (15)
coincides with (13) when s = 0. Hence, Lemma 3 is a corollary of Lemma 2 obtained by
setting s = 0 into Lemma 2.
Second-period compatibility choice in Model 2
Case 1: when compatibility was chosen in period one.
Suppose that both firms chose compatibility in the first period. Let ∆v = 1 without
loss of generality. If both firms choose compatibility in the second period, then firm i’s
second-period profit is:
(
di1,x + d
i
1,y
)
pi+∗2 +
(
dh1,x + d
h
1,y
)
pi−∗2 , (16)
17Since Di1 (Dh1 ) is log-concave in P i1 (Ph1 ), the same argument given in footnote 15 applies here to
establish that F.O.C. are sufficient.
18If we consider P i1 > Ph1 , then Di1 < Dh1 , which implies that not both equalities can be satisfied.
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where di1,j is the first-period market share of firm i for product j, and di1,j + dh1,j = 1. If
any of the two firms chooses incompatibility in the second period, then i’s profit is
di1,xd
i
1,yΠ
+∗
2 +
(
di1,xd
h
1,y + d
h
1,xd
i
1,y
)
Π0∗2 + d
h
1,xd
h
1,yΠ
−∗
2 . (17)
Therefore, firm i chooses compatibility in the second period as long as (16) is at least
as large as (17). Using Lemmas 1-3, we have the following result:
Lemma 4. Suppose that compatibility was chosen in period one (and let ∆v = 1 w.l.o.g.).
Then compatibility choices in the second period are as follows:
(i) If s is such that 2pi+∗2 −Π+∗2 ≥ 0 (i.e., s ≤ s1), then both firms choose compatibility
for any (di1,x, di1,y) in [0, 1]2.
(ii) If s is such that 2pi+∗2 − Π+∗2 < 0 (i.e., s > s1), then at least one firm chooses
incompatibility if and only if di1,x and di1,y are both close to 1 or both close to 0.
Proof. (i) Using (16) and (17), we see that firm i prefers compatibility if and only if
2pi−∗2 − Π−∗2 ≥ di1,xdi1,y(Π+∗2 + Π−∗2 −
1
2
) + (di1,x + d
i
1,y)(
1
4
− Π−∗2 − pi+∗2 + pi−∗2 ) (18)
Likewise, firm h prefers compatibility if and only if
2pi+∗2 − Π+∗2 ≥ di1,xdi1,y(Π+∗2 + Π−∗2 −
1
2
) + (di1,x + d
i
1,y)(
1
4
− Π+∗2 + pi+∗2 − pi−∗2 ) (19)
If s ≤ s¯1, then we prove that (18) holds for each (di1,x, di1,y) ∈ [0, 1]2 by showing that
the maximum of the right hand side, considered as a function of (di1,xdi1,y) ∈ [0, 1]2, is
not larger than 2pi−∗2 − Π−∗2 , the left hand side. To this purpose, notice that the Hessian
matrix of the right hand side is indefinite, hence no maximum point exists in the interior
of [0, 1]2, and we examine the four edges of the square [0, 1]2. For instance, if we consider
the edge such that di1,x = 1 then the right hand side of (18) is di1,y(Π
+∗
2 + Π
−∗
2 − 12) + (1 +
di1,y)(
1
4
−Π−∗2 −pi+∗2 +pi−∗2 ), a linear function of di1,y which is smaller than 2pi−∗2 −Π−∗2 both
at di1,y = 0 and at di1,y = 1 . The other three edges of the square are dealt with similarly.
The proof for (19) follows the same lines.
(ii) The proof follows from immediate manipulations of (18)-(19).
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For s > s1, firm i prefers incompatibility if
di1,x >
pi+∗2 + pi
−∗
2 − Π02
Π+∗2 + pi
−∗
2 − pi+∗2 − Π02
and di1,y >
2pi−∗2 − Π−∗2 − (Π02 − Π−∗2 − pi+∗2 + pi−∗2 )di1,x
(Π02 − Π−∗2 − pi+∗2 + pi−∗2 ) + (Π+∗2 + Π−∗2 − 2Π02)di1,x
,
that is if di1,x and di1,y are close enough to one. This is intuitive, as when di1,x and di1,y are
both close to 1, the comparison between (16) and (17) approximately reduces to 2pi+∗2 vs
Π+∗2 , and s > s1 implies 2pi
+∗
2 < Π
+∗
2 . Likewise, firm h prefers incompatibility if dh1,x and
dh1,y are close to 1 (i.e., when di1,x and di1,y are close to zero). For instance, when s = 1.1,
Figure 3 shows that firm i prefers incompatibility if (di1,x, di1,y) is above the thin curve;
firm h prefers incompatibility if (di1,x, di1,y) is below the thick curve.
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
d
i 1,
y
Figure 3: Second-period compatibility choice when compatibility was chosen in period
one for s = 1.1
As s increases, the set of (di1,x, di1,y) such that at least one firm prefers incompatibility
becomes wider, but for no s it includes the point such that di1,x = di1,y =
1
2
, as the following
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corollary states.
Corollary 4. Suppose that the firms chose compatibility in the first period (and let ∆v = 1
w.l.o.g.). In the case of symmetric first-period market shares, that is dA1,x = dB1,x = dA1,y =
dB1,y =
1
2
, both firms prefer compatibility to incompatibility for any s ∈ (0, 3/2).
Given symmetric first-period market shares, from comparing (16) with (17) we find,
for any s ≥ 0
pi+∗2 + pi
−∗
2 >
1
4
(Π+∗2 + Π
−∗
2 ) +
1
2
Π0∗2 ,
where the L.H.S. (the R.H.S) is each firm’s second-period profit under compatibility (un-
der incompatibility). As we wrote after Lemma 3, competition in market (i, h) under
incompatibility is more intensive than competition in (i, i) under incompatibility or under
compatibility. More precisely, Π0∗2 < min
{
pi+∗2 + pi
−∗
2 ,
1
2
(Π+∗2 + Π
−∗
2 )
}
for any s > 0. This
force induces the firms to embrace compatibility no matter what the level of switching
cost even if pi+∗2 + pi
−∗
2 <
(
Π+∗2 + Π
−∗
2
)
/2 holds for s > s2.
Case 2: when incompatibility was chosen in period one.
We now consider the case in which incompatibility was chosen in the first period, hence
no consumer buys a hybrid system in period one. Let Di1 denote i’s first-period market
share.
Suppose first incompatibility prevails in period two. Competition under incompati-
bility in each market (i, i) is described by Lemma 2. Hence firm i’s second-period profit
is
Di1Π
+∗
2 +D
h
1 Π
−∗
2 . (20)
Suppose now that the first-period incompatibility is followed by the second-period
compatibility. Then, as we wrote just after Lemma 1, the firms’ second-period profits in
each market ij do not depend on the first-period compatibility regime. Therefore, Lemma
1 applies and firm i’s second-period profit is
2
(
Di1pi
+∗
2 +D
h
1pi
−∗
2
)
. (21)
In order to compare (20) and (21), we use Dh1 = 1 − Di1 and see that firm i prefers
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second-period compatibility if and only if
Di12pi
+∗
2 + (1−Di1)2pi−∗2 > Di1Π+∗2 + (1−Di1)Π−∗2 ,
which is equivalent to Di1 <
2pi−∗2 −Π−∗2
Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 −(2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
≡ D.19 Likewise, firm h with h 6= i
prefers second-period compatibility if and only if
Di12pi
−∗
2 + (1−Di1)2pi+∗2 > Di1Π−∗2 + (1−Di1)Π+∗2 ,
which is equivalent to Di1 >
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 −(2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
≡ D. Then the following lemma is
immediate.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the firms chose incompatibility in the first period (and let ∆v = 1
w.l.o.g.). Then compatibility choices in the second period are as follows:
(i) If Π+∗2 < 2pi
+∗
2 (that is, if s < s1), then D > 1 and D < 0. Hence compatibility
emerges in the second period for any Di1 ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) If Π+∗2 + Π
−∗
2 ≥ 2pi+∗2 + 2pi−∗2 (that is, if s ≥ s2), then D ≤ D. Hence incompatibility
emerges in the second period for any Di1 ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) If Π+∗2 ≥ 2pi+∗2 and Π+∗2 + Π−∗2 < 2pi+∗2 + 2pi−∗2 (that is, if s1 ≤ s < s2), then
0 ≤ D < 1
2
< D ≤ 1. Hence compatibility (incompatibility) emerges in the second
period if D < Di1 < D (if Di1 ≤ D, or Di1 ≥ D).
Proof. It is omitted as it is straightforward.
We know from Corollary 3 that if the dominant firm prefers compatibility (i.e., if
Π+∗2 < 2pi
+∗
2 ), then also the dominated firm prefers compatibility (i.e., Π
−∗
2 < 2pi
−∗
2 ).
Therefore, as long as the dominant firm prefers compatibility (i.e., if s < s1), (20) is
greater than (21) for any Di1 and both firms choose compatibility in the second period.
As the switching cost becomes larger than s2, the inequality Π+∗2 + Π
−∗
2 > 2pi
+∗ + 2pi−∗2
holds. Then incompatibility emerges since this inequality means that the sum of the
second-period profits is greater under incompatibility than under compatibility. Therefore
at least one firm prefers incompatibility. Lemma 4(i) and Lemma 5 show that if s < s1,
19Notice that the denominator Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 − (2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 ) is positive for each s ∈ (0, 32 ).
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the firms always end up choosing compatibility in period two regardless of the first-period
compatibility regime and market shares. But such strong prediction cannot be made for
s between s1 and s2.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Given s < s¯1, we will have the second period compatibility regardless of first period
market shares, by Lemma 5(i). As a consequence, given a pair of the first-period prices
under incompatibility
(
P i1, P
h
1
)
, we consider the following profit functions:
Πi = Di1(P
i
1 + δ2pi
+∗
2 ) + (1−Di1)(δ2pi−∗2 ), Πh = (1−Di1)(P h1 + δ2pi+∗2 ) +Di1(δ2pi−∗2 ),
(22)
where Di1 is firm i’s market share in period one and is given by (8). Then, we can argue
as in the proof of Proposition 2 to find the first period equilibrium prices P i∗1 = P h∗1 =
t− δ (2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 ). Therefore the equilibrium profit for each firm is t2 + δ2pi−∗2 .
(ii) For s ∈ [s2, 3
2
), Lemma 5 implies that for any
(
P i1, P
h
1
)
, the second-period com-
patibility regime will be incompatibility. Therefore, we consider the profit functions from
(7). Then the proof of Proposition 2 applies.
Statement and Proof of Proposition 13
Proposition 13. Suppose that incompatibility was chosen in the first period. Let ∆v = 1
without loss of generality. Suppose that Π+∗2 ≥ 2pi+∗2 and 2pi+∗2 + 2pi−∗2 > Π+∗2 + Π−∗2 (i.e.,
s is between s1 and s2).
(i) If a pure strategy equilibrium exists (symmetric or asymmetric), then PA∗1 = PB∗1 =
t− δ (2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 ), as in Proposition 4(i).
(ii) For each s ∈ (s1, s2), the prices in (i) constitute an equilibrium if δ/t ≤ r¯IC(s) ≡√
2(1−D¯)+2·(3D¯−2)
(Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 −(2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 ))
√
2(1−D¯)
.
Proof.
Suppose that s ∈ (s¯1, s¯2). We prove three claims: (i) no equilibrium exists such
that incompatibility arises at stage two; (ii) the only candidate for equilibrium is such
that P i∗1 = P h∗1 = t − δ
(
2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2
)
; (iii) no profitable deviation exists if and only if
δ
t
≤ r¯IC(s).
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Proof of claim (i) There exists no equilibrium such that D < Di < D¯ for
some firm i
We first prove that in no equilibrium we have Di ≥ D¯.
Suppose that P i∗1 , P h∗1 is an equilibrium with Di1 = D. Then the profit of firm i if
P i < P i∗1 is Πi in (7), and its derivative with respect to P i needs to be non-negative at
P i = P i∗1 , that is
dDi1
dP i1
(P i∗1 + δ(Π
+∗
2 −Π−∗2 )) +D ≥ 0. The profit for firm i if P i is slightly
higher than P i∗1 is Πi in (22) and its derivative with respect to P i needs to be non-positive
at P i = P i∗1 , that is
dDi1
dP i1
(P i∗1 + δ(2pi
+∗
2 − 2pi−∗2 )) + D ≤ 0. However, these inequalities
cannot both hold since dD
i
1
dP i1
< 0 and Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 > 2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 .
Suppose that P i∗1 , P h∗1 is an equilibrium such that D < Di1 < 1, which implies P i∗1 <
P h∗1 . Then the profit functions are (7) in a neighborhood of (P i∗1 , P h∗1 ), and from these
profit functions we obtain first order conditions as in the proof of Proposition 2, which
rule out P i∗1 < P h∗1 .
Suppose that P i∗1 , P h∗1 is an equilibrium with Di1 = 1. Then the derivative of the
profit function of firm i with respect to P i is equal to one at P i = P i∗ because ∂D
i
1
∂P i1
= 0.
Therefore it is profitable for firm i to increase slightly P i above P¯ i.
Now consider the case of Di ≤ D. If there exists an equilibrium such that Di ≤ D,
then Dh ≥ D¯ and we can rule out this case as we have ruled out above that Di ≥ D¯.
Proof of claim (ii) The only possible equilibrium is such that P i∗1 = P h∗1 =
t− δ (2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 )
We know that if P ∗i, P ∗h is an equilibrium, then D < Di < D¯. Hence the profit
functions are given by (22) in a neighborhood of (P ∗i, P ∗h), and from these profit functions
we obtain first order conditions as in the proof of Proposition 4(i), which imply P i∗1 =
P h∗1 = t− δ
(
2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2
)
.
Proof of claim (iii) The prices P i∗1 = P h∗1 = t − δ
(
2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2
)
constitute an
equilibrium if and only if δ/t is sufficiently close to 0
Given P i∗1 = P h∗1 = t − δ
(
2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2
)
, it is immediate that for no firm there exists
a profitable deviation which leads to compatibility in period two, hence we consider here
deviations which lead to incompatibility in period 2, that is such that Di ≤ D, or Di ≥ D¯.
Deviations with large P Given that firms are symmetric, it suffices to consider the
point of view of firm i at stage one, given incompatibility at stage one. Given P h∗1 = P ∗1 =
t−δ(2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 ), let P be the price of firm i such thatDi1 = D (recall that for s ∈ (s¯1, s¯2),
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we have 0 < D < 1
2
). Precisely, P belongs to (P ∗1 , P ∗1 +2t) and is such that
1
2
(1+
P ∗1−P
2t
)2 =
D, that is P = P ∗1 +2t−2t
√
2D. Since P i1 = P induces incompatibility in period two, the
profit of firm i from playing P i1 = P is D
(
t− δ(2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 ) + 2t− 2t
√
2D + δΠ+∗2
)
+
(1−D)δΠ−∗2 , that is
(3− 2
√
2D)Dt+ δ
(
Π+∗2 − 2pi+∗2 + Π−∗2
)
(23)
after using D = Π
+∗
2 −2pi+∗2
Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 −(2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
. The difference between the equilibrium profit t
2
+
δ2pi−∗2 and (23) is(
1
2
− (3− 2
√
2D)D
)
t+ δ(2pi+∗2 + 2pi
−∗
2 − Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 )
which is positive for eachD ∈ (0, 1
2
) since 1
2
−(3−2√2D)D = (1+2√2D)(1
2
√
2−√D)2 > 0
and 2pi+∗2 + 2pi
−∗
2 − Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 > 0 as s < s¯2.
In fact, firm i can achieve incompatibility in the second period by choosing any P i ∈
(P , P ∗+ 2t], and in such a case the profit of firm i is Di1[P i + δ(Π
+∗
2 −Π−∗2 )] + δΠ−∗2 , with
derivative
dDi1
dP i
(P i + δ(Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 )) +Di1 (24)
Now consider the profit under compatibility in the second period, which isDi1[P i+δ(2pi
+∗
2 −
2pi−∗2 )]+δ(2pi
−∗
2 ), and its derivative with respect to P i,
dDi1
dP i
[P i+δ(2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 )]+Di1, which
is larger than (24) because Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 > 2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 . Since dD
i
1
dP i
[P i+δ(2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 )]+Di1 <
0 for each P i > P ∗1 ,20 in particular for P i > P , it follows that (24) is negative.
Deviations with small P Given P h∗1 = P ∗1 = t − δ(2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 ), let P¯ be the price
of firm i such that Di1 = D¯ (recall that for s ∈ (s¯1, s¯2), we have 12 < D¯ < 1). Precisely,
P¯ belongs to (P ∗ − 2t, P ∗) and is such that 1− 1
2
(1− P ∗−P¯
2t
)2 = D¯, hence P¯ = P ∗ − 2t+
2t
√
2(1− D¯). Since P i1 = P¯ induces incompatibility in period two, the profit of firm i from
playing P i1 = P¯ is D¯
(
t− δ(2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 )− 2t+ 2t
√
2(1− D¯) + δΠ+∗2
)
+ (1 − D¯)δΠ−∗2 ,
that is (
2
√
2(1− D¯)− 1
)
D¯t+ δ2pi−∗2 (25)
20This follows from the log-concavity of Di1: see footnote 17.
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after using D¯ = 2pi
−∗
2 −Π−∗2
Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 −(2pi+∗2 −2pi−∗2 )
. The difference between the equilibrium profit t
2
+
δ2pi−∗2 and (25) is (
1
2
− 2D¯
√
2(1− D¯) + D¯
)
t
which is positive for each D¯ > 1
2
since 1
2
− 2D¯
√
2(1− D¯) + D¯ = (2D¯−1)
2
(8D¯+1)
2(1+2D¯+4D¯
√
2(1−D¯))
> 0.
In fact, i can achieve incompatibility in the second period by choosing any P i ∈
[P ∗− 2t, P¯ ), and in such a case the profit of firm i is Di1(P i + δ(Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 )] + δΠ−∗2 , with
derivative (24) which is equal to
1
4t2
(
−3
2
(P i)2 − (2t+ ∆Πδ + 4∆piδ)P i − 4(∆pi)
2δ2 − 7t2 + 2∆Πtδ + 4∆pitδ + 4∆Π∆piδ2
2
)
(26)
with ∆Π = Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 , ∆pi = 2pi+∗2 − 2pi−∗2 . Notice that if (26) is positive or zero at
P i = P¯ , then we can conclude that the profit from deviation is increasing with respect
to P i for P i ∈ [P ∗ − 2t, P¯ ), hence no profitable deviation exists, since we have already
proved that deviating with P i = P¯ is unprofitable. Precisely, at P i = P¯ we find that (26)
is equal to −2 + 3D¯ + t+2∆piδ−∆Πδ
2t
√
2(1− D¯), which is non-negative since δ/t ≤ r¯IC(s).
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider an equilibrium such that for each firm i, the profit in (16) is strictly greater
than the profit in (17) at the equilibrium values for di1,x, di1,y. Then compatibility arises
also in period two and the profit functions are given by (3) in a neighborhood of first
period equilibrium prices. Then we can argue as in the proof of Proposition 1 and find
first period equilibrium prices and profits p∗1, pi∗ in (5)-(6). Moreover, thanks to Corollary
4 we know that given di1,x = di1,y =
1
2
, both firm choose compatibility in the second period.
Given the equilibrium candidate we mentioned above, now we show that no profitable
deviation exists if and only if Π+∗2 − 2pi+∗2 ≤ tδ .
(a) First, Proposition 1 implies that no profitable deviation exists which induces com-
patibility in period two. Therefore, no profitable deviation exists if Π+∗2 ≤ 2pi+∗2 (that is,
if s ≤ s¯1) because then Lemma 4(i) reveals that compatibility necessarily emerges in the
second period.
(b) Now consider the case in which Π+∗2 > 2pi
+∗
2 . Then, by Lemma 4(ii) there exist devi-
ations of firm i which lead to incompatibility in the second period such that di1,x, di1,y are
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both close to 1, or both close to 0. We show that no profitable deviation exists for firm
i if and only if Π+∗2 − 2pi+∗2 ≤ tδ . Given incompatibility in period two, the total profit of
firm i is
Πi = di1,xp
i
1,x + d
i
1,yp
i
1,y
+ δ
[
di1,xd
i
1,yΠ
+∗
2 + d
i
1,xd
h
1,yΠ
0∗
2 + d
i
1,yd
h
1,xΠ
0∗
2 + d
h
1,xd
h
1,yΠ
−∗
2
]
= di1,xp
i
1,x + d
i
1,yp
i
1,y + δBd
i
1,xd
i
1,y + δ(Π
0∗
2 − Π−∗2 )(di1,x + di1,y) + δΠ−∗2 (27)
where di1,j =
1
2
+ 1
2t
(p∗1 − pi1,j) for j = x, y, and B = Π+∗2 + Π−∗2 − 12 > 0. We now prove
that to maximize (27) with respect to pi1,x, pi1,y, we can restrict to considering pi1,x = pi1,y:
Lemma 6. Suppose that the firms chose compatibility in the first period and that a deviat-
ing firm expects that the incompatibility prevails in the second period. Then, without loss
of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations in the first period such that pi1,x = pi1,y.
Proof of the lemma. Suppose that firm i deviates with pi1,x 6= pi1,y. Then consider
pˆi1,x, pˆ
i
1,y such that pˆi1,x = pˆi1,y =
1
2
(pi1,x + p
i
1,y) ≡ pˆi1. Then the demand for the product of
firm i is dˆi1 =
1
2
(di1,x + d
i
1,y) in each market and i’s profit is21
2dˆi1pˆ
i
1 + δB(dˆ
i
1)
2 + δ
[
Π0∗2 − Π−∗2
]
2dˆi1 + δΠ
−∗
2
which is larger than (27) because (i) 2dˆi1pˆi1 = 2
1
2
(di1,x + d
i
1,y)
1
2
(pi1,x + p
i
1,y) = d
i
1,xp
i
1,x +
di1,yp
i
1,y +
1
2
(pi1,x−pi1,y)(di1,y−di1,x) = di1,xpi1,x+di1,ypi1,y + 14t(pi1,x−pi1,y)2 > di1,xpi1,x+di1,ypi1,y;
(ii) δB(dˆi1)2 > δBdi1,xdi1,y because δB > 0 and (dˆi1)2 > di1,xdi1,y, given that dˆi1 =
1
2
(di1,x+d
i
1,y)
; (iii) δ
[
Π0∗2 − Π−∗2
]
2dˆi1 = δ
[
Π0∗2 − Π−∗2
]
(di1,x + d
i
1,y). 
Given a symmetric deviation such that pi1,x = pi1,y ≡ p, we have di1,x = di1,y = 1 −
δ
2t
(
pi+∗2 − pi−∗2
)− 1
2t
p ≡ d and
Πi = 2dp+ δd2B + 2δd(Π0∗2 − Π−∗2 ) + δΠ−∗2
= −4t
(
1− δ
4t
B
)
d2 + 4t
(
1− 2δ
4t
A
)
d+ δΠ−∗2 , (28)
21Notice that if incompatibility emerges in the second period given di1,x, di1,y, then it also emerges
given the market shares dˆi1, dˆi1 in each market, given the shape of the set described in Lemma 4(ii), and
immediately after the lemma.
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where A = −Π0∗2 + Π−∗2 + pi+∗2 − pi−∗2 . Then we need to consider a few cases, as a function
of A and B.
Suppose that 1− δ
4t
B ≤ 0, which implies that Πi is convex in d. Then Πi is maximized
at d = 0 or at d = 1. Precisely, the profit at d = 0 is δΠ−∗2 , which is smaller than the profit
at d = 1, equal to δ
(
Π+∗2 − 2pi+∗2 + 2pi−∗2
)
. The latter is not larger than the candidate
equilibrium profit t+ 2δpi−∗2 if and only if Π
+∗
2 − 2pi+∗2 ≤ tδ .
Now suppose that 1 − δ
4t
B > 0, which implies that Πi is concave in d Then the
maximum point for Πi is either d = 0, or d = 1, or d =
1
2
− δ
4t
A
1− δ
4t
B
if 0 < 1
2
− δ
4t
A < 1− δ
4t
B.22
We have already dealt with the cases of d = 0 and d = 1. When 0 < 1
2
− δ
4t
A < 1− δ
4t
B,
the deviation profit is:
Πi = 4t
(
1
2
− δ
4t
A
)2
1− δ
4t
B
+ δΠ−∗2 .
The difference between the candidate equilibrium profit t+2δpi−∗2 and the deviation profit
is
t+ 2δpi−∗2 − Πi =
1
1− δ
4t
B
[
t(1− δ
4t
B) + δ(1− δ
4t
B)C − 4t
[
1
2
− δ
4t
A
]2]
=
δ
1− δ
4t
B
[
A− B
4
+ C − δ
4t
(A2 +BC)
]
,
where C = 2pi−∗2 −Π−∗2 . Since s > s¯1, the following inequalities hold: 12 − δ4tA ≤ 1− δ4tB,
0 < B − A, and they imply δ
4t
≤ 1
2(B−A) . Since BC + A
2 > 0, we find that
A− B
4
+ C − δ
4t
(A2 +BC) ≥ A− B
4
+ C − A
2 +BC
2(B − A) (29)
Since the right hand side in (29) is positive for each s ∈ (0, 3
2
), it follows that t+ 2δpi−∗2 −
Πi > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
We present the proof in the on-line appendix as it is too long.
22Notice that d =
1
2− δ4tA
1− δ4tB
is the point where the derivative of Πi in (28) vanishes. In fact, we should
verify whether d =
1
2− δ4tA
1− δ4tB
induces incompatibility in period two, but we prove below that Πi in (28) at
d =
1
2− δ4tA
1− δ4tB
is smaller than the candidate equilibrium profit.
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Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 8
The proof is omitted as we explained the results in the main texts.
Proof of Proposition 10
(i) In the compatibility equilibrium, the second-period consumer surplus in market j
is given by
CSj =
1
∆v
ˆ v¯
v
(vij − p+∗2 )dvij −
1
∆v
ˆ ve+p+∗2 −p−∗2 −s
v
(vij − p+∗2 )dvij +
1
∆v
ˆ ve+p+∗2 −p−∗2 −s
v
(ve − p−∗2 − s)dvij
= ve − p+∗2 −
1
2∆v
(
ve + p+∗2 − p−∗2 − s− v
)
(ve − p+∗2 − p−∗2 − s+ v)
+
1
∆v
(
ve + p+∗2 − p−∗2 − s− v
)
(ve − p−∗2 − s)
= ve − p+∗2 +
1
2∆v
(
∆v
2
+ p+∗2 − p−∗2 − s
)2
= ve − p+∗2 +
∆v
2
(d−∗2 )
2 = ve − p+∗2 +
1
2
p−∗2 d
−∗
2
= ve − p+∗2 +
1
2
pi−∗2 .
The first-peirod consumer surplus in market j is 2
´ 1
2
0
(ve − p∗1 − tx)dx = ve − p∗1 − t4 .
Hence, the total consumer surplus in market j is
ve − p∗1 −
t
4
+ δ(ve − p+∗2 +
1
2
pi−∗2 ).
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(ii) In the incompatibility equilibrium, the second-period consumer surplus is given by
CS =
1
(∆v)2
ˆ v¯
v
ˆ v¯
v
(vix + v
i
y − P+∗2 )dvixdviy
− 1
(∆v)2
ˆ 2ve−2s−P−∗2 +P+∗2 −v
v
ˆ 2ve−2s−P−∗2 +P+∗2 −vix
v
(vix + v
i
y − P+∗2 )dvixdviy
+
1
(∆v)2
ˆ 2ve−2s−P−∗2 +P+∗2 −v
v
ˆ 2ve−2s−P−∗2 +P+∗2 −vix
v
(2ve − P−∗2 − 2s)dvixdviy
= 2ve − P+∗2
− 1
(∆v)2
ˆ 2ve−2s−P−∗2 +P+∗2 −v
v
(2ve − 2s− P−∗2 + P+∗2 − vix − v)(2ve − 2s− P−∗2 − P+∗2 + vix + v)dvix
+
(2ve − P−∗2 − 2s)
(∆v)2
ˆ 2ve−2s−P−∗2 +P+∗2 −v
v
(2ve − 2s− P−∗2 + P+∗2 − vix − v)dvix
= 2ve − P+∗2
− (2v
e − 2s− P−∗2 + P+∗2 − 2v)2
2(∆v)2
[
−1
3
(2ve − 2s− P−∗2 + P+∗2 − 2v) + (2ve − 2s− P−∗2 )
]
+
(2ve − 2s− P−∗2 + P+∗2 − 2v)2
2(∆v)2
(2ve − 2s− P−∗2 )
= 2ve − P+∗2
+
1
3
(2ve − 2s− P−∗2 + P+∗2 − 2v)2
2(∆v)2
(2ve − 2s− P−∗2 + P+∗2 − 2v)
= 2ve − P+∗2 +
2
3
D−∗2 P
−∗
2 = 2v
e − P+∗2 +
2
3
Π−∗2 .
The first-period consumer surplus is
2
ˆ 1
0
ˆ 1−x
0
(2ve − P ∗1 − tx− ty)dydx = 2ve − P ∗1 −
2
3
t.
Hence, the total consumer surplus is
2ve − P ∗1 −
2
3
t+ δ
(
2ve − P+∗2 +
2
3
Π−∗2
)
.
(iii) As enough details are given in the main text, the proof is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 11
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The welfare is simply obtained by adding consumer surplus to profits, which we pre-
sented in previous propositions. Regarding (iii), as enough details are given in the main
text, the proof is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 12
The proof is omitted as it is a minor adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3.
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12 On-line Appendix (not for publication): Proof of
Proposition 6
We are considering the equilibrium candidate in which a firm i corners the other firm, h,
in the first period in both markets. Precisely, firm i plays a price p¯ in each market and
firm h plays price p¯ + t in each market, with p¯ to be determined. As a consequence, the
profit of firm i is 2p¯+ δΠ+∗2 , the profit of firm h is δΠ
−∗
2 .
Step 1 No deviation which induces incompatibility is profitable for any firm
if and only if
p¯ = ηt− δ
2
(Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 ) for some η ∈ [0, 1] (30)
Consider a deviation of firm i such that it plays price pi ∈ (p¯, p¯+ 2t] in both markets;
this implies that the quantity sold by firm i in each market is di = 1
2
+ 1
2t
(p¯ + t − pi).
Second-period incompatibility arises if the market share of firm i is either close to 1 in
both markets, or close to zero in both markets. Then the profit of firm i is f i(di) = 2dipi+
δ
(
Π+∗2 (d
i)2 + 1
2
di(1− di) + Π−∗2 (1− di)2
)
, with B = Π+∗2 + Π
−∗
2 − 12 and C = 14 − Π−∗2 .
Using pi = 2t + p¯ − 2dit we obtain f i(di) = (Bδ − 4t) (di)2 + (4t+ 2p¯+ 2Cδ) di + δΠ−∗2 .
In equilibrium, firm i is supposed to play pi = p¯, such that di = 1 and f i(1) = 2p¯+ δΠ+∗2 .
We are considering δ
t
> 4
B
, hence f i is convex and for firm i no deviation which induces
incompatibility in the second period is profitable if and only if f i(1) ≥ f i(0), that is if
and only if 2p¯+ δΠ+∗2 ≥ δΠ−∗2 , or − δ2(Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 ) ≤ p¯.
Now consider firm h and a deviation such that firm h plays price ph ∈ [p¯ − t, p¯ + t)
in both markets; this implies that the quantity sold by firm h in each market is dh =
1
2
+ 1
2t
(p¯−ph), and its profit is fh(dh) = 2dhph+δ (Π+∗2 (dh)2 + 12dh(1− dh) + Π−∗2 (1− dh)2).
Using ph = t + p¯ − 2dht we obtain fh(dh) = (Bδ − 4t) (dh)2 + 2 (t+ p¯+ Cδ) dh + δΠ−∗2 .
In equilibrium, firm h is supposed to play ph = p¯+ t such that dh = 0 and fh(0) = δΠ−∗2 .
Since fh is convex (as δ
t
> 4
B
), it follows that for firm h no deviation which induces
incompatibility in the second period is profitable if and only if fh(0) ≥ fh(1) that is if
p¯ ≤ t− δ
2
(Π+∗2 − Π−∗2 ).
Step 2 A lower bound on δ/t
We need some preliminaries in order to state the result precisely. In addition to
B = Π+∗2 +Π
−∗
2 − 12 , we define E = Π+∗2 +pi−∗2 − 14−pi+∗2 > 0, F = Π−∗2 +pi+∗2 − 14−pi−∗2 > 0,
∆+ = Π+∗2 − 2pi+∗2 > 0, ∆− = Π−∗2 − 2pi−∗2 > 0, ∆± = ∆+ −∆− > 0.
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Compatibility in period two arises if and only if the inequalities (18)-(19) in the proof
of Lemma 4 are satisfied, and notice that they can be indifferently written as a function
of dix, diy, or of dhx, dhy . Here we use the latter variables:
F (dhx + d
h
y)−Bdhxdhy ≥ ∆− E(dhx + dhy)−Bdhxdhy ≥ ∆+ (31)
The set of dhx, dhy which satisfies (31) is represented in Figure 3 (after changing the labels
of the axes to dhx, dhy). Notice that
• in case that firm h plays the same price in both markets, we have dhx = dhy ≡ dh, and
then both inequalities in (31) are satisfied if and only if dh is included between a
lower bound d` and an upper bound du, that is d` ≤ dh ≤ du with d` = E−
√
E2−B∆+
B
and du = F+
√
F 2−B∆−
B
;
• the southwest border of the feasible set is the graph of the curve
dhy = q(d
h
x), with q(d
h
x) =
∆+ − Edhx
E −Bdhx
for dhx ∈ [0,
∆+
E
] and q(d`) = d` (32)
We now define several values of r = δ
t
, which we use to identify a lower bound for δ
t
:
r˜(s, η) ≡ (4 + 2η)d` − 2η − 4d
2
`
∆− + ∆±d`
, r¯(s, η) ≡ 2 (2 + η) ∆
± + 8∆− − 4√(2η∆± + 4∆−) ∆+
(∆±)2
(33)
ri(s, η) = max{r˜(s, η), r¯(s, η)} rh(s, η) ≡ 2d` + 2ηd` − 4d
2
`
∆− + ∆±d`
(34)
Finally, for each s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
), let ηm(s) denote the unique η ∈ (0, 1) such that ri(s, η) =
rh(s, η) (existence and uniqueness of ηm(s) are proved in Step 2.1.3 below). The function
rCI(s) we mention in Proposition 7 is defined as rCI(s) = rh(s, ηm(s)). Now we can state
Proposition 7 in detail:
Proposition 7 Suppose that compatibility was chosen in the first period, and suppose
that s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
). Then a cornering equilibrium exists if and only if δ
t
≥ rCI(s). Precisely,
in the first period one firm charges price p¯ = ηm(s)t− δ2(Π+∗2 −Π−∗2 ) in both markets, the
other firm charges price p¯ + t in both markets, and the first firm corners both markets.
In the second period, incompatibility is chosen at least by the firm who cornered the
52
markets, which earns a total profit of 2ηm(s)t+δΠ−∗2 ; the other firm’s total profit is δΠ
−∗
2 .
For each s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
), we have 3/2
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
< rCI(s) <
16/9
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
.
In the proof we give below we consider first (in Step 2.1) deviations such that each firm
plays the same price in both markets. In Step 2.2 we show that no profitable deviation
exists even if the deviating firm can charge different prices in different markets.
Step 2.1: For each s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
), for no firm there exists a profitable deviation
which induces compatibility in period two and such that the firm chooses the
same price in both markets if and only if δ
t
≥ rCI(s)
Step 2.1.1: No profitable deviation exists for firm i if and only if δ
t
≥ ri(s, η); moreover,
ri(s, η) = r¯(s, η) if η > 0.059234.
Given the price pi played by firm i in both markets, the demand for product ij is
di = 1
2
+ 1
2t
(p¯ + t − pi) (for j = x, y), and inverting this relation we obtain pi = 2t + p¯
−2tdi. Hence, the profit of firm i is gi(di) = 2dipi + 2δ[dipi+∗2 + (1− di)pi−∗2 ] = −4t(di)2 +
(4t + 2ηt − δ∆±)di + 2δpi−∗2 for di ∈ [d`, du]. A necessary condition for no profitable
deviation to exist for firm i is gi(d`) ≤ 2ηt+ δΠ−∗2 (2ηt+ δΠ−∗2 is the equilibrium profit of
firm i), which is equivalent to δ
t
≥ r˜(s, η). We need to distinguish two cases, depending
on the value of η.
−4(d)2 + (4 + 2η)d− 2η < δ
t
(∆− + ∆±d)
• Case A: 0.059234 < η ≤ 1. The derivative of gi is gi′(di) = −8tdi+4t+2ηt−δ∆± and
gi′(d`) ≤ 0 if and only if δt ≥ 4+2η−8d`∆± ≡ rˆ(s, η). It turns out that r˜(s, η) < rˆ(s, η)
for each s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
) since η > 0.059234.23 Therefore, no profitable deviation exists
for firm i when δ
t
≥ rˆ(s, η).
• Now consider δ
t
between r˜(s, η) and rˆ(s, η). Then the profit maximizing di is
4+2η− δ
t
∆±
8
, which is larger than d` but smaller than du.24 We have that gi(
4+2η− δ
t
∆±
8
) =
1
16t
(4t+ 2ηt− δ∆±)2 + 2δpi−∗2 is smaller than 2ηt+ δΠ−∗2 if and only if
−(∆±)2(δ
t
)2 + 4
(
(2 + η)∆± + 4∆−
) δ
t
− 4(2− η)2 ≥ 0 (35)
23Precisely, r˜(s, η) < rˆ(s, η) is equivalent to 2d2`∆
± ≤ 2(1− 2d`)∆− + η∆+.
24For each s ∈ (s¯3, 32 ), we have that 34 < du and gi′( 34 ) = 2ηt− 2t− δ∆± < 0.
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At δ
t
= r˜(s, η), the left hand side of (35) is negative since gi(d`) = 2ηt+ tr˜(s, η)Π−∗2
and gi′(d`) > 0. At δt = rˆ(s, η), the left hand side in (35) is positive since
4+2η−rˆ(s,η)∆±
8
= d` and gi(d`) < 2ηt + trˆ(s, η)Π−∗2 . Therefore, in case A no prof-
itable deviation exists for firm i if and only if δ
t
is at least as large as the smallest
solution to (35), which is r¯(s, η), a number between r˜(s, η) and rˆ(s, η).
• Case B: 0 ≤ η ≤ 0.059234. In this case rˆ(s, η) ≤ r˜(s, η) for some s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
), and
then no profitable deviation exists for firm i if and only if δ
t
≥ r˜(s, η) (in this case
r¯(s, η) < r˜(s, η)). If the inequality r˜(s, η) < rˆ(s, η) holds for some s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
), then
we can argue as for case A above that no profitable deviation exists for firm i if and
only if δ
t
≥ r¯(s, η). Hence, in case B no profitable deviation exists for firm A if and
only if δ
t
≥ max{r˜(s, η), r¯(s, η)}.
Joining the two cases A and B, we conclude that no profitable deviation exists for firm
i if and only if δ
t
≥ max{r˜(s, η), r¯(s, η)}, which is defined as ri(s, η) in (34).
Step 2.1.2: No profitable deviation for firm h exists if and only if δ
t
≥ rh(s, η).
Given the price ph played by firm h in both markets, the demand for product hj is
dh = 1
2
+ 1
2t
(p¯− ph) (for j = x, y), and inverting this relation we obtain ph = t+ p¯− 2tdh.
Hence the profit of firm h is gh(dh) = −4t(dh)2 + (2t + 2ηt − δ∆±)dh + 2δpi−∗2 for dh ∈
[d`, du]. Notice that a necessary condition for no profitable deviation to exist for firm
h is gh(d`) ≤ δΠ−∗2 (δΠ−∗2 is the equilibrium profit of firm h), which is equivalent to
δ
t
≥ rh(s, η). The derivative of gh is gh′(dh) = −8tdh + 2t + 2ηt − δ∆±, and gh′(d`) ≤ 0
if and only if δ
t
≥ 2+2η−8d`
∆± . It turns out that rh(s, η) >
2+2η−8d`
∆± for each s ∈ (s¯3, 32) and
each η ∈ [0, 1], hence no profitable deviation for firm h exists if and only if δ
t
≥ rh(s, η).
Step 2.1.3: For each s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
), there exists a unique η which minimizes max{ri(s, η), rh(s, η)}
For given s and η, from Steps 2.1 and 2.2 it follows that no profitable deviation exists
for firm i and firm h if and only if δ
t
≥ max{ri(s, η), rh(s, η)}. Then, for a given s, we
choose η to minimize max{ri(s, η), rh(s, η)}. It turns out that (i) ri(s, 0) > rh(s, 0) and
ri(s, 1) < rh(s, 1) for each s ∈ (s¯3, 32); (ii) ri(s, η) is decreasing in η and rh(s, η) is increasing
in η. Hence, for each s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
) we conclude that max{ri(s, η), rh(s, η)} is minimized by
the unique η ∈ (0, 1) such that ri(s, η) = rh(s, η). We denote this value with ηm(s). Sup-
pose that for some s, ηm(s) is such that ri(s, ηm(s)), that is max{r˜(s, ηm(s)), r¯(s, ηm(s))},
is equal to r˜(s, ηm(s)). Then from the equation r˜(s, ηm(s)) = rh(s, η) we find that
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ηm(s) = d`, but d` turns out to be greater than 0.17 for each s ∈ (s¯3, 32). Since
0.17 > 0.059234, from case A we know that r˜(s, ηm(s)) < r¯(s, ηm(s)) and this contra-
dicts that max{r˜(s, ηm(s)), r¯(s, ηm(s))} = r˜(s, ηm(s)). Therefore, for each s, ηm(s) is such
that ri(s, ηm(s)) = r¯(s, ηm(s)). From the equation r¯(s, η) = rh(s, η) we find that ηm(s) ∈
(2
9
t, 3
11
t), which implies that rCI(s) = rh(s, ηm(s)) satisfies 3/2Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
< rCI(s) <
16/9
Π+∗2 −2pi+∗2
.
Step 2.2: For each s ∈ (s¯3, 3
2
), let η be equal to ηm(s) and δt ≥ rCI(s). Then for no
firm there exists a profitable deviation which induces compatibility in period
two, even though each firm can charge different prices in different markets
Step 2.2.1: Proof for firm i.
Let pix, piy denote the prices charged by firm i in period one and dix, diy the resulting
demands for the products of firm i. Arguing as in Step 1.1 we find pix = 2t+ p¯ −2tdix and
piy = 2t+ p¯ −2tdiy, hence the profit of firm i under compatibility is
Gi(dix, d
i
y) = −2t(dix)2 + (2t+ tηm(s)−
δ
2
∆±)dix− 2t(diy)2 + (2t+ tηm(s)−
δ
2
∆±)diy + 2δpi
−∗
2
Notice that Gi is a concave function to maximize in the feasible set we denote with F: see
Figure 3. Hence, if there exists a critical point (di∗x , di∗y ) of Gi in F (a point where both
partial derivatives of Gi vanish), then (di∗x , di∗y ) is a global max point for Gi. The proof
of Step 2.1 reveals that (di∗x , di∗y ) = (
4+2ηm(s)− δt∆±
8
,
4+2ηm(s)− δt∆±
8
) is a critical point for Gi
in F if rCI(s) < δt < rˆ(s, ηm(s)) (recall that rCI(s) = ri(s, ηm(s)) = r¯(s, ηm(s))) but since
di∗x = d
i∗
y , we know from Step 2.1 that it does not constitute a profitable deviation for firm
i.
Conversely, for δ
t
> rˆ(s, ηm(s)) there exists no critical point for Gi in F. This suggests
to inspect the boundaries of F, but it is immediate that the north-east boundary does
not contain any maximum point, by the virtue of the remark in footnote 24. About the
southwest boundary, consider any point (dix, diy) which belongs to this boundary for which
we know that G(dix, diy) < 2ηm(s)t+ δΠ
−∗
2 when
δ
t
= rˆ(s, ηm(s)). For δt > rˆ(s, ηm(s)), the
same inequality holds because the derivative of the right hand side with respect to δ, Π−∗2 ,
is greater than the derivative of the left hand side with respect to δ, 2pi−∗2 − 12(dix+diy)∆±.
Therefore, for each δ
t
≥ rCI(s) no profitable deviation exists for firm i even though firm i
can charge different prices in different markets.
Step 2.2.2: Proof for firm h.
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Let phx, phy denote the prices charged by firm h in period one and dhx, dhy the resulting
demands for the products of firm h. Arguing as in Step 2.1 we find phx = t+ p¯− 2tdhx and
phy = t+ p¯− 2tdhy , hence the profit of firm h under compatibility is
Gh(dhx, d
h
y) = −2t(dhx)2 + (t+ ηm(s)t−
δ
2
∆±)dhx − 2t(dhy)2 + (t+ ηm(s)t−
δ
2
∆±)dhy + 2δpi
−∗
2
From the proof of Step 2.1 we know that there exists no critical point of Gh in F, given that
δ
t
≥ rCI(s). Hence each global maximum point of Gh belongs to the southwest boundary
of F,25 which is the curve dhy = q(dhx) described in (32) Notice that q′(dhx) =
B·∆+−E2
(E−Bdhx)2 < 0
with q′(d`) = −1, and q′′(dhx) = 2B(B·∆
+−E2)
(E−Bdhx)3 < 0. Hence firm h’s profit along the southwest
border is given by
gq(d
h
x) = G
h(dhx, q(d
h
x)) = −2t(dhx)2+(t+ηm(s)t−
δ
2
∆±)dhx−2t(q(dhx))2+(t+ηm(s)t−
δ
2
∆±)q(dhx)+2δpi
−∗
2
for dhx ∈ [0, ∆
+
E
].
Now we prove that no profitable deviation exists for firm h when δ
t
= rh(s, ηm(s)),
because in this case gq is maximized at dhx = d` as g′q(d`) = 0 and gq is concave; thus
no profitable deviation exists for firm h since gq(d`) = δΠ−∗2 is equal to the equilibrium
profit. Precisely, we find that
g′q(d
h
x) = −4tdhx + t+ ηm(s)t−
δ
2
∆± − 4tq(dhx)q′(dhx) + (t+ ηm(s)t−
δ
2
∆±)q′(dhx)
and g′q(d`) = 0 since q(d`) = d` and q′(d`) = −1. Moreover,
g′′q (d
h
x) = −4t− 4t(q′(dhx))2 − 4tq(dhx)q′′(dhx) + (t+ ηm(s)t−
δ
2
∆±)q′′(dhx)
= −4t− 4t(B ·∆
+ − E2)2
(E −Bdhx)4
− 8tB(∆
+ − Edhx)(B ·∆+ − E2)
(E −Bdhx)4
+ (t+ ηm(s)t− δ
2
∆±)q′′(dhx)
and if δ
t
= rh(s, ηm(s)) we have (t+ηm(s)t− δ2∆±)q′′(dhx) < 0 because t[1+ηm(s)− δ2t∆±] =
t
(1+ηm(s))∆−+2∆±d2`
∆−+∆±d`
> 0 and q′′(dhx) < 0. The other terms in g′′q (dhx) have the same sign as
−(E − Bdhx)4 − (B∆+ −E2)2 + 2B(E2 − B∆+)(∆+ − Edhx). For any fixed s, this is a
25The northeast boundary cannot include any global optimum point because ∂G
h
∂dhx
= −4tdhx+t+tηm(s)−
δ
2∆
±, which is negative for each dhx ≥ 12 . A similar property holds for ∂G
h
∂dhy
.
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concave function of dhx which is maximized dhx =
E
B
− 1
B
(
E3−B·∆+·E
2
)1/3
and the maximum
value of the function is negative. Therefore g′′q (dhx) < 0.
We have established above that gq(dhx) ≤ δΠ−∗2 for each dhx ∈ [0, ∆
+
E
] when δ
t
=
rh(s, ηm(s)). When instead δt > rh(s, ηm(s)), the inequality gq(d
h
x) < δΠ
−∗
2 still holds
for each dhx ∈ [0, ∆
+
E
] because the derivative of the right hand side with respect to δ,
Π−∗2 , is greater than the derivative of the left hand side with respect to δ, which is
2pi−∗2 − 12∆±dhx − 12∆±q(dhx).
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